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The most fundamental feature of negligence law is the "reasonable person"
standard. This feature bases negligence law on a strictly objective
foundation: it requires people to behave in the prudent way that, as Holmes
explained, the ordinary, typical member of their community observes. In
this Article we argue that with the increasing availability of information
about actors’ characteristics, negligence law should give up much of its
objectivity by allowing courts to “subjectify” the standard of care—that is,
to tailor it to the specific injurer’s tendency to create risks and her abilities
to reduce them. We discuss the effects of this personalization of the
standard of care on injurers' and victims' incentives to take care, injurers'
activity levels and the injurers' ex ante investments in improving their
skills. We also discuss justice considerations as well as the feasibility of
personalization with the aid of Big Data.
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INTRODUCTION
The law takes no account of the infinite varieties of
temperament, intellect, and education which make
the internal character of a given act so different in
different men.
– Oliver Wendell Holmes, THE COMMON LAW1
The most fundamental feature of negligence law is the "reasonable
person" standard. This feature bases negligence law on a strictly objective
foundation: it requires people to behave in the prudent way that, as Holmes
explained, the ordinary, typical member of their community observes. The
standard of care is uniform across the population, rarely varying with the
skills and dangers of each actor.
In this Article we challenge the reasonable person paradigm. We argue
that with the increasing availability of accurate information about actors’

1

O. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 108 (1881).
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characteristics, negligence law should give up much of its objectivity by
allowing courts to “subjectify” the standard of care—that is, to tailor it to
the specific actor’s tendency to create risks and her abilities to reduce them.
Rather than addressing each actor as a non-distinct member of a large pool
and commanding her to meet the level of reasonable precautions that
correspond to the average competence within the pool, a personalized
negligence law would separate the actor from the pool and require her to
meet her own customized standard of care. The "Reasonable Person”
standard, traditionally derived from an aggregate relevant pool, would be
replaced by the "Reasonable You” standard—a personalized command that
is based on information about this actor’s specific characteristics.
The idea that standards of care ought to be personalized to the
particular circumstances of the particular defendant may strike our readers
as old news. Surely, a doctor is required to perform a treatment at a more
advanced level of care than a layperson, and a physically disabled person
may be allowed to satisfy a lower level of precaution. An actor who has
special knowledge or experience may be required to do more than one who
has not.
Despite this intuition, tailored standards of care are the exception, not
the rule. From its early days, negligence law has wrestled with the
personalization problem. When a cognitively limited defendant who caused
fire asked the court to acknowledge his incompetence and apply a more
forgiving standard of care, the court—in a landmark decision—refused and
explained that it would be impossible for negligence liability to be “coextensive with the judgment of each individual, which would be as variable
as the length of the foot of each individual.” The court, instead, chose “to
adhere to the rule which requires in all cases a regard to caution such as a
man of ordinary prudence would observe.”2 Holmes explained that this
approach is justified by the “impossibility of nicely measuring a man’s
powers and limitations.”3
Yet, over time, negligence law has created sub categories of actors,
lowering or raising the standard of care within each category to reflect
special skills. For example, children or the physically disabled may be held
to lower standards (although their license to engage in the activity in the
first place may be more stringent).4 And, conversely, medical professionals
are held to higher standards than non-professionals.5
Personalized negligence law—the Reasonable You standard—takes
this already familiar (but sparingly applied) approach of partitioning
injurers into relevant classes, and expands it to its conceptual limit.
Whereas the heightened standard of care for doctors carves a specific pool

2

Vaughan v. Menlove, (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P.); 3 Bing. 468 (N.C.).
HOLMES, supra note 1, at 108.
4 See infra Section I.A.
5 See infra Section I.B.
3
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(all doctors in the relevant practice, or with the specific advanced
specialty), it still relies on average competence within a defined pool to
determine what is reasonable. Personalized negligence law creates, for each
defendant, a pool of one. What is reasonable for this defendant would be
determined, not by reference to the average traits of some larger reference
group to which this defendant belongs, but only according to the
information available about this defendant.
Consider, for example, a typical problem addressed by negligence
law: what is a reasonable driving speed in tough road conditions? Imagine
that a 65-year-old driver, cruising at 35mph, injures a child who jumps into
the street chasing a ball. Under prevailing negligence law, the court
assumes that the driver is not different from any other driver in the
population and would set the standard of care according to the capabilities,
the reaction time, and the tendency to inflict harm that the court expects the
average driver to have. If at a speed of 35mph the average brake time for
drivers is thought to be short enough even in relation to the risk of children
at play in a residential neighborhood, the 65 year old driver would not be
regarded as negligent.
Under personalized negligence law, the capabilities of the average
driver are not relevant. First, it might be that the average 65-year-old driver
has inferior driving capabilities and slower response than the average
driver. If so, 35mph might not be negligent for younger drivers but
negligent for the 65-year-old.6 This would be a first, albeit crude, step in
personalization, using a finer partition of the population of drivers and
deriving the standard from a smaller subset.
But personalization would not stop there. Not all 65-year-old drivers
are alike. The courts might have additional information about the specific
defendant, which would allow for further refinement of the standard of
care. Some of that information might relate to his past experience in
driving—allowing the court to make a statistical inference about the
defendant’s risk “type” and adjust the standard accordingly. Such
personalization based on past experience is similar to the “experience
rating” methodology that insurers use in inferring idiosyncratic risk and in

6

It might be that older age brings more experience and responsibility, which could pull to
the other direction. This is typically the case with very young drivers vs. older drivers, but
not when the ages are 45 and 65, as in our example. See, e.g., Tim Horberry et al., Driver
Distraction: The Effects of Concurrent In-Vehicle Tasks, Road Environment Complexity and
Age on Driving Performance, 38(1) ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 185 (2006)
(studying the effects of distractions upon driving performance, finding that drivers over the
age of 60 tend to drive slower and more cautiously while distracted); Judith L. Charlton et
al., Older Driver Distraction: A Naturalistic Study of Behaviour at Intersections, 58
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 271 (2013) (finding that older drivers self-regulate by
limiting their engagement in distracting behaviors when the driving task is more challenging
compared with less demanding situations).
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pricing auto insurance policies.7 It is also similar to the approach taken by
criminal law in treating past offenders differently than first-timers.8
More interestingly, some of the additional information deployed in
constructing the Reasonable You standard might relate to the defendant’s
other characteristics, beyond his past driving record. This information
would allow the court to make reliable inferences about the risk that this
defendant creates, the risk he should have created and the precautions he
should have taken given his characteristics. It is information reflecting on
his driving capabilities, other risky activity he takes, and his skills and
resources in reducing these risks. With the aid of more advanced
information tools—including what has come to be known as Big Data9—
courts might know that the defendant is very risk averse (or risk preferred),
that he engages in frequent activities that make his instincts and reactions
faster (or slower) than those of the average driver, or that in other parts of
his life he is generally a very careful (or careless) person. A clumsy, or
impulsive, or prone-to-lapses person may need to be confronted with a
more demanding standard of care. Again, similar to the “feature rating”
methodology that insurers use to rate policyholders, courts can use
statistical correlations in assessing the risk posed by the defendant. Taking
into account every known relevant factor would assist the court in setting
the more efficient Reasonable You standard—the level of care that this
specific individual is expected to take.
This article examines the case for personalized negligence law along
two channels of inquiry. The first channel is normative: Does
personalization advance the goals of negligence law—efficient deterrence
and just compensation? In exploring these questions, one of the major
contributions of this article is the distinction between skill-based versus
risk-based personalization, demonstrating the effects of personalization
along those dimensions in various ways. The first dimension—skill-based
personalization—addresses each actor’s subjective ability to take
precautions. It measures how effective this actor’s care is in reducing the
risk to victims. For example, skill-based personalization would place a
greater precaution burden on actors who can reduce risk more cheaply. The
7

Ragnar Norberg, The Credibility Approach to Experience Rating, 1979(4) SCAND.
ACTUARIAL J. 181, 181-82 ("At the outset all drivers in a particular classification group are
charged the same premium. Thereafter, the premiums are adjusted annually according to
bonus rules, which are to the effect that drivers with a favourable claims record are allowed
a premium deduction (bonus), whilst those with an unfavourable one will experience a
premium increase (malus)").
8 David A. Dana, Rethinking the Puzzle of Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders, 110
YALE L.J. 733, 733 (2001) ("The legal system punishes repeat offenders more severely than
nonrepeat offenders. Second-time offenders receive more severe punishment than first-time
offenders; repeat offenders with many previous offenses receive more severe punishment
than repeat offenders with a few previous offenses").
9 See Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with
Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417 (2014) (presenting the concept of Big Data, discussing its
legal applications and exploring its possible role of in the personalization of default rules).
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second dimension—risk-based personalization—addresses each actor’s
inherent riskiness. It measures the different expected risks actors create at
any given investment in care. For example, risk-based personalization
would place a greater precaution burden on actors who, at any given level
of care, create higher risks.
This distinction between the two dimensions is fundamental to our
analysis. When we say that a particular injurer is more harmful it might
have two different sources: less skillful in prevention, or more inherently
risky. The implications for personalization depend on the source. For
example, greater harmfulness due to low skill makes it unwise to demand
high precautions from the injurer, suggesting an adjustment of the standard
of care downwards. By contrast, greater harmfulness due to high inherent
riskiness makes it all the more urgent to demand high precautions,
suggesting an opposite adjustment of the standard of care—upwards.
To illustrate the distinction between the two dimensions and its
importance, compare a driver with poor instincts to a driver with sharp
instincts. Assuming everything else is equal, we will require the poorinstincts driver to take more precautions to reduce risks than from the
sharp-instincts driver, since for each dollar of precaution by the former
more risks will be reduced. Here, higher harmfulness (in terms of higher
inherent dangerousness) requires more precaution. Compare now a driver
with poor technical skills with a driver with high technical skills, and
assume that there is a new technology that might reduce risks of driving but
requires high technical skills for effectively operating it. Assuming
everything else is equal, we might require the driver with the high technical
skills to use the new technology but not the driver with the poor technical
skills, since for each dollar of precaution by the former more risks will be
reduced. As we can see, now, in contrast to the former case, higher
harmfulness (in terms of low skills) requires less precaution.
These effects are just the tip of the iceberg. Our analysis within the
normative channel of inquiry identifies a wealth of effects that personalized
standards of care would have on injurers’ precaution, activity levels, and
ex-ante incentives to invest in reducing their harmfulness. It shows that
relative to a regime of uniform standards, personalization leads to more
efficient precaution, and has the potential to alleviate the excessivebehavior distortion congenital to negligence rules. They incentivize actors
to reduce their inherent riskiness when possible, but may undermine their
incentives to become more skilled at harm reduction. This latter effect can
be tackled, we show, if personalization is designed correctly. Personalized
standards also affect victims in predictable ways. It might be thought that
facing personalized care by injurers (say, drivers each obeying a different,
personalized speed limit), victims endure a more uncertain and volatile
environment, diminishing their ability to take efficient contributory care.
Not so. While drivers’ speed—and other precautions—may vary more
under personalized standards, the risks that they pose to victims may in fact
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be less variable and more easily mitigated.
The second channel of inquiry pursued in this article is positive. It
asks whether personalization can be implemented. What are the
information obstacles and how can they be addressed? What sources of
information might be harnessed to the personalization enterprise? Not
surprisingly, we envision a process that relies on advances in information
technology, from in-depth screening of individuals to statistical analysis of
large data. If Big Data is reliably predictive in high-stakes industries like
financial services and insurance, and increasingly in medicine, why not in
law?
It is not enough, however, to show that more data and better screening
could be deployed by courts in adjudication. The challenge for a successful
negligence regime is to show that actors would be able to anticipate the
more refined burdens and adjust their behavior. Otherwise, if the greater ex
post accuracy does not translate to ex ante behavior, it might merely
impose excessive information costs.10 Recognizing this dilemma, we make
the counterintuitive argument that personalization could make it easier, not
harder, for actors to predict the standard of care applicable to them. People
often know better what is reasonable for them to do, given their
idiosyncratic characteristics. It is harder to know what the average skills
and risks are. Thus, in the driving example, the prevailing reasonable
person standard asks the driver to meet a standard of care tailored to the
impersonal reasonable driver, but he is not this driver, and would need
much more information than mere self-introspection to figure it out.
Beyond these two channels of inquiry, we ask a series of related
questions, the most important of which is how to evaluate the personalized
standards regime from corrective and distributive justice perspectives. We
recognize that under some conceptions of corrective justice,
personalization is problematic because its primary prescription—to adjust
the injurer’s obligation based on the cost of care—infringes the notion of
equality between the injurer and victim, since it allows the injurer to
unilaterally draw the line between his and the victim's rights. We disagree
with this view. First, why should a particularly skilled injurer not owe a
heightened duty of care to a victim, and be required to correct this victim’s
harm when breaching the duty? Moreover, personalization is not merely
about different burdens of care, but also about different risks which
different injurers create. We argue that raising the liability standard for
people who create greater risk than average and lowering the standard for
people who create lower risk than average is required by any plausible
10

Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J. L. ECON. & ORG.
150 (1995) [hereinafter Kaplow, Optimal Complexity] (arguing that low information costs
for the enforcement authority improve complex rules' efficiency); Louis Kaplow, General
Characteristics of Rules, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Boudewijn
Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) (discussing the relationship between a legal
command's precision, costs, and resulting behavior).
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corrective justice account. Lastly, we comment on the distributive justice
aspects of personalization. True, it treats similarly situated injurers
differently, and it might expose some victims to higher risks of physical
injury. But, quite intuitively, personalization has the potential of promoting
equality among differently situated injurers and at the same time increasing
victims' safety.
This article fits within a literature that examined the optimal tailoring
of legal rules.11 The idea of personalizing default rules, for example, has
been studied in various contexts by some authors,12 and further expanded
recently by Porat and Strahilevitz.13 In the torts literature, early law and
economics writers recognized that tailored duties could improve
efficiency.14 Posner and Shavell have separately explained that the reason
the standard of care is not adapted to the specific injurer is the saving of
administrative costs.15 Shavell further showed that if courts are constrained
to apply a uniform standard of care for all injurers, they should minimize
the costs of some injurers taking too much, and others taking too little,
care.16 These writers, as well as Warren Schwartz in an excellent article,
recognized that personalized standards of care might have problematic
At the most general level, Louis Kaplow’s work on the optimal precision of legal rules
lays a foundation for the inquiry into tailoring any legal command. Louis Kaplow, Optimal
Complexity, supra note 10, at 502-07 (discussing the possible problems caused by rule
precision and analyzing its negative and positive effects).
12 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) (differentiating between tailored, untailored and
penalty default rules in contract law, providing a theory for when courts should fill
contractual gaps using each method); George S. Geis, An Experiment in the Optimal
Precision of Contract Default Rules, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1109 (2006) (offering models of
tailored and untailored default rules under particular sets of assumptions to analyze the
welfare implications of trading off precision against complexity); Cass R. Sunstein,
Deciding by Default, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2013) (differentiating between impersonal
default rules, active choosing and personalized default rules, concluding that the choice
between regimes is dependent on costs of decisions and errors, and therefore varies between
target groups).
13 Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 9 (suggesting the use of Big Data to personalize
disclosures, thereby increasing their relevance and effectiveness).
14 WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 124
(1987) (arguing that a uniform standard creates two effects of misallocation: injurers with
low costs of taking care would have no incentive to take care beyond the reasonable person
standard, even though it would be socially desirable for them to do so, and injurers with
slightly higher than average costs of care would nevertheless adhere to the uniform standard
so as to avoid bearing all liability).
15 RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 218 (8th ed. 2011) (arguing that the
reasonable person standard adhered to by courts is justified by the administrative costs
courts would bear in attempting to measure the actual individual costs of each party);
STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 89 (1987) ("if courts can
determine an injurer's type and thus set the due level of care for each type equal to the
socially optimal level, injurers of each type will be led to take socially optimal care... it is
socially desirable for courts to acquire information about an injurer's type if the cost of
doing so is sufficiently low").
16 Id. at 86-88 (showing that if courts cannot determine an injurer's type, they would choose
a single due care level that is optimal for the average type of injurer).
11
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effects on the level of activity.17 They recognized that uniform standards
could drive out activities of very high risk injurers.18 Finally, both Shavell
and Schwartz recognized that the incentives to make ex ante investments
(such as being sober while driving or acquiring information about risks)
would be affected by a personalized standards regime.19 None of these have
examined the distinction between injurers who vary by skill and injurers
who vary by riskiness.20
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I introduces the concept of
personalizing the standard of care and outlines some of its appearances in
prevailing tort law. Part II substantiates the claim that personalizing the
standard of care is generally more efficient than having a "one-size-fits-all"
standard of care. Part III looks at personalizing the standard of care from a
justice perspective, showing that while corrective justice notions might be
consistent with personalization in only some cases, distributive justice
considerations mainly support personalization in almost all cases. Part IV
explains how personalization could be broadly implemented in negligence
law, among other things, with the aid of Big Data. Conclusion summarizes
our proposal for personalization of the standard of care, pointing out
several options for personalization, and offers a few extensions to other
fields of the law.
I. PERSONALIZED NEGLIGENCE UNDER EXISTING LAW
Current law does not personalize standards of care. It adheres, instead,
to a regime of uniform, non-personalized, standards. According to the
Third Restatement, “A person acts negligently if the person does not
exercise reasonable care under all the circumstances.”21 Reasonable care
requires balancing the “foreseeable likelihood that the person's conduct will
result in harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue, and the
burden of precautions to eliminate or reduce the risk of harm.”22 The Third
Restatement clarifies that its balancing approach is identical to the

17

Warren F. Schwartz, Objective and Subjective Standards of Negligence: Defining the
Reasonable Person to Induce Optimal Care and Optimal Populations of Injurers and
Victims, 78 GEO. L. J. 241 (1989).
18 SHAVELL, supra note 15, at 91.
19 Id. at 92 ("if due care equals the socially optimal level, then injurers will be led to choose
both the socially optimal level of prior precautions and the socially optimal level of care");
Schwartz, supra note 17, at 254-57.
20 But see Charles R. Korsmo, Lost in Translation: Law, Economics, and Subjective
Standards of Care in Negligence Law, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 285, 292 (2013), who makes
this distinction, but does not explore the full set of incentive effects due to the two types of
personalization.
21 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 3 (2010).
22 Id. This wording indicates that the Restatement endorsed the Hand Formula for
determining negligence. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 159 F.2d 169 (2d. Cir.
1947) (determining liability upon whether the burden of adequate precautions is smaller
than the multiplication of the damages caused by their probability).
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reasonably careful person approach "because a 'reasonably careful
person'… is one who acts with reasonable care…".23 The "reasonably
careful person" standard is explicitly objective and, therefore, nonpersonal.24 The law does not generally ask whether a given person took as
much care as she personally ought to have taken, given the risk she creates
and the risk reduction skills she has. Rather, it insists that individuals be
judged according to the standard of an external reasonable actor,
representing some aggregate community measure.25
Objective standards do not mean one-size-fits-all. The present
objective regime permits some partition of the reference group against
which an actor’s behavior is judged. While the partition does not go so far
as to personalize negligence law, courts have been willing to adjust
standards of care to account for several special human characteristics that
are thought to have strong correlation with riskiness of actors and with the
effectiveness of their precautions. These characteristics include inherently
diminished physical and cognitive capacity; enhanced special skills,
intelligence, or knowledge; and doctors and medical institutions with either
enhanced or diminished resources.

A. Diminished Capacity
Tort law treats several groups of people with diminished capacity
differently, applying a separate standard of care. These groups include the
physically disabled, the mentally disabled and children.
Physically Disabled. Actors with physical disabilities generally face a
standard of care in accordance with their condition: “The conduct of an
actor with a physical disability is negligent only if the conduct does not
conform to that of a reasonably careful person with the same disability.”26
For example, a blind or deaf person is only required to take the
contributory precautions reasonable in light of her limitation.27 This
adjustment of the standard of care is often downward: for example, such
precautions cannot include looking or listening for a train at a railroad

23

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 3 cmt. a (2010).
As such, the Restatement determines "reasonable care" by considering objective "primary
factors", namely foreseeable likelihood of harm, foreseeable severity of harm and burden of
precautions. Considerations of more personal characteristics such as age and knowledge are
limited to particular categories. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM
§ 3 cmt. d (2010).
25 See, e.g., Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 201 (1959) ("the standard of care is the
conduct of the reasonable person of ordinary prudence under the circumstances").
26 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 11 (2010).
27 Muse v. Page, 4 A.2d 329, 331 (Conn. 1939) ("reasonable care in the case of one with
such defective vision as the plaintiff had, is such care as an ordinarily prudent person with a
like infirmity would exercise under the same or similar circumstances"); Fink v. City of
New York, 132 N.Y.S.2d 172, 173 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (ruling that a deaf mute hit by a fire
truck sounding its alarm is free from contributory negligence, having exercised the
necessary due care allowed by his affliction).
24
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crossing.28 This is consistent with what later in the article we call skillbased personalization: people whose inherent skill in taking precautions is
lower (or private cost of taking precautions is higher) should optimally take
less care.29 But, the adjustment of standards may also go the opposite way,
raising the burden of preventions. A paralyzed driver whose physical
disability diminishes his control of the car might be required to take
additional precautionary measures that an able-bodied driver would not be
required to take, such as installing special steering mechanisms or special
brakes.30 This is consistent with what later in the article we call the riskbased personalization: people whose conduct creates higher risk should
take more care.
Children. Children face standards of care distinct from, and generally
lower than, those of adults: “[a] child's conduct is negligent if it does not
conform to that of a reasonably careful person of the same age,
intelligence, and experience.”31 This, again, is consistent with skill-based
personalization: a child is “manifestly incapable of exercising any of those
qualities of attention, intelligence and judgment which are necessary to
enable him to perceive a risk and to realize its unreasonable character.”32
This adjustment is more finely personalized: if the child has different
intelligence and experience than children of comparable age, the standard
would be further adjusted. It could shift upwards: “a child who has not yet
attained his majority may be as capable as an adult.”33 And it can shift

28

See, e.g., Railroad v. Dies, 98 Tenn. 655, 663 (1897) ("These obligations to stop and look
and listen [before going over the tracks of a railroad] must receive a reasonable construction
and interpretation... [a party] cannot be required to listen if he is deaf…").
29 A related justification is that adjustment of the standard of care affords people with
physical disabilities some security in living their daily lives: DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 119 (2000). See also Avihay Dorfman, Negligence and Accommodation: On
Taking Others as They Really Are (Dec. 27, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2543262 (noting that cases in which
physical disadvantage warranted a watered-down standard of care were cases of
contributory or comparative negligence, whereas cases concerning the conduct of the
tortfeasor did not make allowance for her physical disability).
30 While the law does not require sighted individuals to use seeing eye dogs or canes to
navigate public walkways, a blind person who fails to do so and is injured can be considered
negligent. See, e.g., Poyner v. Loftus, 694 A.2d 69, 71-72 (D.C. 1997).
31 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 10 (2010); See also, e.g., Hoyt
v. Rosenberg, 503, 182 P.2d 234, 236 (Cal. App. 1947) ("While a minor, like an adult, is
required to exercise ordinary care he is only required to exercise that degree or amount of
care that is ordinarily exercised by one of like age, experience and development").
32 Lutteman v. Martin, 135 A.2d 600, 602-03 (Conn. C.P. 1957).
33 Id. at 603. For example, children are often held to a higher standard of care, similar to that
of adults, when performing what are considered "adult activities" such as driving an
automobile or operating a snowmobile. See, e.g., Dellwo v. Pearson, 107 N.W.2d 859, 863
(Minn. 1961) ("While minors are entitled to be judged by standards commensurate with age,
experience, and wisdom when engaged in activities appropriate to their age, experience, and
wisdom, it would be unfair to the public to permit a minor in the operation of a motor
vehicle to observe any other standards of care and conduct than those expected of all
others"). Bernstein's view is that by partaking in such activity, a child "assume[s] the
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downwards, if a child of a given age is demonstrably less capable than his
or her peers—perhaps because of immaturity or other developmental
delays.34
Mentally disabled. In general, tort law makes no allowance for mental
disability or insanity: “An actor's mental or emotional disability is not
considered in determining whether conduct is negligent, unless the actor is
a child.”35 But in one specific area, standards of care may be adjusted
downwards for mentally disabled individuals.36 This is in determining
whether a mentally disabled plaintiff was contributorily negligent.
Lowering the standard of contributory care for mentally disabled victims
shifts greater liability and cost of precaution to their negligent injurers, and
relieves these victims of some of the losses they would have otherwise had
to bear. Adjusting the standard of care of the mentally disabled victim—but
not the injurer—is a manifestation of the idea (also embedded in the eggshell skull principle37) that the defendant “takes the victim as she finds
him.”38
It is something of a mystery why tort law treats the mentally disabled
differently from physically disabled and children. One possible justification
is evidentiary: it is relatively easy to determine physical disability and the
age of a child but relatively difficult to verify the specific effects of mental
illness.39 This justification ignores the fact that the law takes a highly
combination of selected risks, pleasures, and accountability that characterizes autonomous
adult life" and therefore "must accept... the rigors of adult-level reasonable care.". Anita
Bernstein, The Communities That Make Standards of Care Possible, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
735, 759 (2001-2002).
34 Soledad v. Lara, 762 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex. App. 1988) ("The fact that a child is mentally
retarded, or that he is unusually bright for his years is to be taken into account.").
35 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 11 (2010). See also, Johnson v.
Lambotte, 363 P.2d 165, 166 (Colo. 1961) ("The general rule is that an insane person may
be liable for his torts the same as a sane person, except perhaps those in which malice and,
therefore, intention are necessary ingredients"); Burch v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 543
N.W.2d 277, 280 (Wis. 1996) ("a tortfeasor's mental capacity cannot be invoked to bar civil
liability for negligence").
36 See, e.g., Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1060 (Utah 1989) ("In contrast to
the use of an objective standard in cases of primary negligence, the majority of courts have
adopted a more compassionate stance regarding the contributory negligence of the mentally
impaired. Those who are insane are incapable of contributory negligence, whereas lesser
degrees of mental impairment should be considered by the jury in determining whether the
plaintiff was contributorily negligent."); Snider v. Callahan, 250 F.Supp. 1022, 1023 (W.D.
Mo. 1966) ("with respect to contributory negligence, in Missouri and in many other states a
subjective standard is applied to children and persons suffering from a mental deficiency.");
See generally Joseph P. Flynn, Contributory Negligence of Incompetents, 3 WASHBURN L.J.
215 (1964) (debating case law examples of contributory negligence by mentally ill
tortfeasors).
37 See, e.g., Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403, 404 (Wis. 1891).
38 See Dorfman, supra note 29 (justifying the asymmetrical measurement of reasonable care
across the defendant/plaintiff divide by the notion that tortfeasors should take potential
victims as they find them).
39 See David E. Seidelson, Reasonable Expectations and Subjective Standards in Negligence
Law: The Minor, the Mentally Impaired, and the Mentally Incompetent, 50 GEO. WASH. L.
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granular approach to determining standards of care for children, including
their mental development (but perhaps children are less likely to bluff
cognitive impairment in legal proceedings). It also runs against the
existence of satisfactory methods to assess the skills and riskiness of a
defendant alleged to be mentally disabled.40 Another justification for the
reluctance to personalize standards of care for the mentally disabled is that
doing so will incentivize their caretakers to take precautions for them. But
this justification, if it has any force, should apply even more strongly to
children than it does to mentally disabled adults. Children are more likely
to be under the direct supervision of a caretaker than are mentally disabled
adults, and any tort damages they are instructed to pay would more often be
funded by an adult caretaker. And yet children’s standards are adjusted
downwards, effectively exempting their caregivers from the onus of step-in
care, while the same forgiving standards are denied for the mentally
disabled.41

B. Elevated Capacity
In an apparent asymmetry, tort law principles allow courts to take into
account elevated capacity more broadly than diminished capacity. First,
elevated capacity is relevant in general, as a category, and it is not limited
to a closed list of cases. Thus, “[i]f an actor has skills or knowledge that
exceed those possessed by most others, these skills or knowledge are
circumstances to be taken into account in determining whether the actor has
behaved as a reasonably careful person.”42 Second, elevated capacity is
relevant not only when it is inherent, but also when it is deliberately
acquired.43 However, in practice this principle of elevated capacity is
applied inconsistently. For example, courts have been willing to account

REV. 17 (1981) (differentiating between the reasonable expectations of a plaintiff facing a
minor to those of one facing a mentally disabled defendant, arguing that "to give the
[defendant] the benefit of the less demanding standard, when the [plaintiff] has no
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the first actor's impairment, would impose on the
[plaintiff].").
40 Harry J.F. Korrell, The Liability of Mentally Disabled Tort Defendants, 19 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 1 (1995) (arguing that medicine does not draw a clear line between mental
defects and physical defects, and that the same logic which supports setting special
standards of care for children and the physically disabled applies to the mentally disabled as
well); Jacob E. McKnite, When Reasonable Care Is Unreasonable: Rethinking the
Negligence Liability of Adults with Mental Retardation, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1375
(2012) (arguing that a subjective standard of care for the mentally disabled is administrable).
41 Cf. Sarah Light, Rejecting the Logic of Confinement: Care Relationships and the Mentally
Disabled Under Tort Law, 109 YALE L.J. 381 (1999) (arguing that allowing subjective
standards of care for the mentally disabled would increase incentives for the mentally
disabled to seek proper treatment); Seidelson, supra note 39 (arguing for decreasing the
standard of care for the mentally disabled based on justice considerations).
42 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 12 (2010).
43 See, e.g., Everett v. Bucky Warren, Inc., 380 N.E.2d 653, 659 (Mass. 1978) (holding a
hockey coach to a higher standard of care due to his substantial experience and knowledge).
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for certain kinds of special skill—like medical training44—while ignoring
others—like professional skill as a driver.45
Defendant’s special skills are most often taken into account in cases
where the defendant’s profession is relevant to the injury. For example,
doctors are held to a standard of care to their patients that is considerably
higher than the reasonable person standard.46 The same is true (although
this varies across jurisdictions47), for example, for architects, engineers, and
physical therapists.48 Even construction workers have been held to a
standard of care that reflects their familiarity with heavy machinery.49
It is unclear to what extent tailored standards based upon professional
experiences are personalized within the profession. For example, in medical
malpractice, the law requires care commensurate with the “average
qualified practitioner.”50 But the level of care to which a doctor is held—
the “average” against which the doctor is evaluated—varies quite a bit by
specialty. Specialists are held to a higher standard when treating an illness
that falls within their purview.51 Some courts have gone even further,
holding that, whatever the medical standard of care, each individual doctor
is required to make decisions to the best of her own judgment, when the
doctor has superior knowledge, skill, or intelligence in reducing risks
inherent to a common practice.52
Considerations of special skill, knowledge, and intelligence are, for

44

Martinez v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 2010 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1317 (Cal. App. 5th
Dist. Feb. 24, 2010) (finding a highway patrol officer negligent for having carelessly
extracted an accident victim from a car, taking into account "that [the officer] had received
medical training and recertification as an EMR at the CHP, and that his training would have
included teaching patient assessment related to C-spine precautions.").
45 See, e.g., Capital Raceway Promotions, Inc. v. Smith, 322 A.2d 238, 246-47 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1974) (affirming the trial court's instruction not to hold a professional race car
driver to a higher standard of care).
46 Palandjian v. Foster, 842 N.E.2d 916, 920 (Mass. 2006) ("A specialist should be held to
the standard of care and skill of the average member of the profession practising the
specialty, taking into account the advances in the profession." (citing Brune v. Belinkoff,
354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793, 798 (1968))).
47 For example, in Fredericks v. Castora, 360 A.2d 696 (Pa. Super. 1976), the court found it
irrelevant to a case involving a motor vehicle crash that the defendant was a truck driver
with twenty years of experience. Id. at 697-98.
48 See, e.g., Simon v. Drake Constr. Co., 621 N.E.2d 837, 838 (Ohio App. 1993)
(architects); Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. LTK Consulting Servs., Inc., 243 P.3d 521, 529
(Wash. 2010) (engineers); Rehabilitative Care Sys. of Am. v. Davis, 73 S.W.3d 233, 234
(Tex. 2002) (physical therapists).
49 Hill v. Sparks, 546 S.W.2d 473, 476 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (ruling that an earth moving
machine operator is negligent for failing to warn the decedent "despite his knowledge and
experience").
50 Palandjian, 842 N.E.2d at 920.
51 Id.
52 Toth v. Cmty. Hosp. at Glen Cove, 239 N.E.2d 368, 372-73 (N.Y. App. 1968) ("a
physician should use his best judgment and whatever superior knowledge, skill and
intelligence he has... Thus, a specialist may be held liable where a general practitioner may
not").
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the most part, a one-way street. While all courts are willing, in a variety of
circumstances, to raise standards of care above the level of the “reasonable
person” for individuals with enhanced capacity, they refuse to decrease
standards of care for individuals with lower than average skill, knowledge,
or intelligence53 (with the exceptions, as we saw, of children, physically
disabled, and sometimes mentally disabled victims54). Part of our goal in
Parts II & III below is to offer a possible rationale for this asymmetric
personalization regime.

C. Resource-Based Personalization
Precautions are costly, and individuals face different resource
constraints that vary the level of care they can optimally satisfy. While in
general negligence law wealth and resources do not matter in setting the
standards of care,55 in medical malpractice law they do.
We saw that doctors are generally required to provide care that is at
least as good as the average qualified medical practitioner, perhaps adjusted
upwards to account for personal expertise. But what is the reference group
from which the average qualification is derived? One dimension of
reference is geographical. Traditionally, medical malpractice law has taken
as the relevant reference the practices of other doctors from the same
locality as the doctor under scrutiny.56 More recently, reference groups
have been broadened to include similar localities, either across the state or
across the country57 (an expansion designed to prevent groups of smalltown doctors from shielding themselves from liability by collectively
refusing to update methods of care to conform to modern practices.58)

53

See, e.g., Stevens v. Fleming, 777 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Idaho 1989) ("Individual
inexperience is not a legitimate reason for a lower standard of conduct."); Summerill v.
Shipley, 890 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("[The defendant]'s inexperience or lack
of knowledge cannot excuse his actions if the jury finds that the reasonable person would
have acted differently in his place."). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. &
EMOT. HARM § 12 cmt. b (2010) ("The fact that a person is below average in judgment,
knowledge, or skills is generally ignored in considering whether the person is negligent.").
54 Supra Section I.A.
55 But see Jennifer H. Arlen, Should Defendants' Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 413
(1992) (arguing that under the assumption that individuals are risk averse, optimal
deterrence would be induced only if wealth differences are taken into account). For a
discussion regarding the possible usage of information concerning wealth in the design of
negligence standards, see infra Section IV.B.4 .
56 See DOBBS, supra note 29, § 244 n. 1 (discussing the rule’s origin in Small v. Howard,
128 Mass. 131 (1880)).
57 See, e.g., Bahr v. Harper-Grace Hospitals, 528 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Mich. 1995) ("the
standard of care for general practitioners is that of the local community or similar
communities, and is nationwide for a specialist.").
58 See, e.g., Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wn.2d 73, 77-78 (Wash. 1967) ("The "locality rule"
had two practical difficulties... second, the possibility of a small group, who, by their
laxness or carelessness, could establish a local standard of care that was below that which
the law requires. The fact that several careless practitioners might settle in the same place
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Such regional variations in the standard of care are certainly a partial
response to perceived variances in levels of physician skill or knowledge.59
But, they are also explicit responses to variations in medical resources. As
one court explained, “[i]n applying this standard it is permissible to
consider the medical resources available to the physician as one
circumstance in determining the skill and care required. Under this
standard, some allowance is thus made for the type of community in which
the physician carries on his practice.”60
Resource-based adjustments in standards of care apply to hospitals as
well.61 Hospitals serving smaller communities may not be asked to
maintain the same medical equipment as their larger neighbors, even if
such absence means lower care. Interestingly, such considerations can be
relevant even where the hospital’s alleged negligence is not in the provision
of medical treatment. If, for example, the hospital applies only limited
security and supervision, enabling a patient to escape the hospital and later
suffer due to lack of proper treatment, the hospital's resources are deemed
relevant.62 In one such case, the court held that “[t]he protection of patients
is not a medical function of a hospital; rather, it is a service provided by a
hospital to its patients, and the ability of a small rural hospital to provide
such a service is limited by its location and resources.”63
***
Our brief survey demonstrates the existence of some personalization
in negligence law. Mostly, this is only crude personalization, partitioning
the population of injurers into subgroups that, as a general approximation,
have different skills or a different degree of riskiness.64 But sometimes it is
more finely done, as in the case of children the willingness of courts to look
at their individual developmental stage. We also saw that personalization
is, in many cases, unidirectional: only higher but not lower skills,
knowledge and experience are taken into account in setting the standards of
care. Hence, while tort law seems open to the idea of true personalization
of standards of care, its progress thus far in that direction has been, at best,
partial and inconsistent.

cannot affect the standard of diligence and skill which local patients have a right to
expect...").
59 See, e.g., Geraty v. Kaufman, 115 Conn. 563, 573 (1932) ("we recognize that a country
surgeon should not be expected to exercise the high degree of skill possessed by eminent
surgeons living in large cities and making a specialty of surgical operations.").
60 Brune v. Belinkoff, 235 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Mass. 1968).
61 Johnson v. Wills Mem'l Hosp. & Nursing Home, 343 S.E.2d 700 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
62 Id. at 701.
63 Id. at 702.
64 For a theoretical analysis of the role of subgroups in negligence law and their relation to
objective and subjective standards, see Bernstein, supra note 33.
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II. THE EFFICIENCY OF PERSONALIZED STANDARDS
Part I presented the law of negligence as a system of uniform
standards. Some pockets of personalization are recognized, but they are the
exception, not the rule. We now turn the core of the Article—the normative
comparison between uniform and personalized standards. In this Part our
yardstick is efficiency while in Part III we analyze personalization from
both corrective and distributive justice perspectives. Our analysis in this
Part compares uniform and personalized standards along several
dimensions: the efficiency of the levels of care and levels of activity of
injurers, the efficiency of victims’ care, and the effect on injurers’ ex-ante
investments in reducing their harmfulness. Along each of these dimensions,
we examine the two types of personalization—skill-based and risk-based—
and demonstrate their centrality to any analysis of personalization.
Throughout this Part, we present our claims through analysis of a
simple numerical example. Most of the insights arising from this example
are general. But not all; and when necessary, we expand the analytical
framework beyond the simple setting.

A. Levels of Care
Assume that injurers can each take precautions that reduce the
probability of accident, but not its magnitude. Suppose, for simplicity, that
these interact with potential victims and may cause a harm of $100 to a
victim. The effectiveness of precautions for a “representative” injurer is as
follows:
Level of
Care
Low
Medium
High

Cost of Care
$6
$16
$26

Probability of
Harm
22%
10%
2%
TABLE 1

Expected Social
Cost
$28
$26*
$28

Looking at the Expected Social Cost column in Table 1, we see that
the lowest social cost is obtained when the injurer takes “medium” care
(lowest social costs are marked by *). Without more information on the
specific competence of each potential injurer, the optimal uniform standard
of care should be “medium,” imposing an average cost of $16 on all
potential injurers. The expected social cost would be $26.
But now suppose that injurers are heterogeneous and that the numbers
in Table 1 are merely averages. Assume that the court has reliable
information about idiosyncratic traits of the injurer-defendant, and that this
information fits one of two categories. The first category is information on
the “skill” that the injurer has in reducing risks—how costly it is for the
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injurer to meet each level of care in Table 1. The second category is
information about the riskiness of each injurer—what is the likelihood at
any precaution level that the harm would happen. Let’s examine what the
best use of such information is.
1. Skill-Based Personalization
The simplest way to capture the idea that injurers have different riskreduction skills is to vary the cost they have to incur in order to reach each
of the three discrete levels of care—low, medium, and high. More skilled
injurers can achieve the same reduction in risk as unskilled injurers by
spending less on care.65 For example, some drivers are more competent in
operating sophisticated technical equipment and therefore can more
effectively reduce risks with such equipment; some doctors are more
experienced than other doctors and therefore can more quickly and cheaply
diagnose certain patients. We can assume that there is a spectrum of skill,
ranging between the highest and lowest skilled injurers. Relative to the
representative injurer depicted in Table 1, the highest skilled injurer can
spend 50% less at each level of care to obtain the same risk reduction,
whereas the lowest skilled injurer must spend 50% more at each level of
care. Table 2 summarizes the precaution choices for these two extreme
types of injurers (which we label “skilled” and “unskilled”):
Level of
Care
Low
Medium
High

Cost of Care
Probability
of Harm
Skilled
Unskilled
$3
$9
22%
$8
$24
10%
$13
$39
2%
TABLE 2

Expected Social Cost
Skilled
Unskilled
$25
$31*
$18
$34
$15*
$41

Notice that the average of skilled and unskilled injurers is exactly the
representative injurer depicted in Table 1. If the standard is set uniformly
for all injurers irrespective of their skill—what we call a uniform standard
regime—the most efficient level would be “medium” and the social cost
would be $26. But society can do better. If the standard is set in a
personalized manner, it would vary across injurer types. Looking at the
Expected Social Cost dual columns in Table 2, we see the lowest cost is
obtained when the skilled injurer takes “high” care and the unskilled injurer

65

Schwartz illustrates this point by presenting a graph which compares the marginal cost
curve of taking care for a blind person alongside a similar graph for a sighted person. The
ensuing conclusion is that as the former bears higher costs for each level of care, it is
efficient for him to take less care. See Schwartz, supra note 17, at 243. For a different
graphical illustration of this argument see Korsmo, supra note 20, at 309-10.
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takes “low” care.66 Instead of requiring all injurers to take “medium” care,
as prescribed under the uniform standard regime, the law can differentiate
the standard of due care according to the skill of the injurers and reduce the
expected social costs. If, for example, there are equal numbers of skilled
and unskilled injurers, the expected social cost will be $23 (average of $15
and $31, the lowest attainable social costs for skilled and unskilled injurers,
respectively)—lower than under a uniform standard regime ($26).67
It is possible that the standards injurers face could be further refined,
applying more than two high/low adjustments. Following the same logic,
this would generate even greater precaution efficiency. The practical
implementation burdens of such continuous personalization will be
discussed in Part IV.
The observation that skill-based personalization is more efficient than
a uniform standard is wholly intuitive. It pays to impose higher burdens on
the more competent actors to take advantage of their greater productivity.
Thus, the driver who is more competent in operating sophisticated technical
equipment should probably use it, while the less competent driver perhaps
should not. 68 Similarly, the experienced doctor who can diagnose a patient
in minutes but who failed to do so, should be considered negligent, while a
less experienced doctor, who needs much more time to diagnose a patient
and failed to do so, perhaps should not be considered negligent (assuming,
in both cases, that the doctor has small amount of time to invest in each
patient because of sudden overload of work).
But a less intuitive aspect is the effect of personalized standards on the
overall costs imposed on differently skilled injurers. Personalized
66

It is assumed, for now, that the highest skilled injurer abides by the high standard of care.
This assumption will be revisited, and the resulting discussion refined, below. See infra text
following note 76.
67 More generally, if injurers’ skill varies along a continuum, anywhere between the +50%
and −50% range (all relative to the representative injurer depicted in Table 1) there is a
threshold of care cost above which injurer’s standard of due care should be scaled down to
“low,” and another threshold of care cost below which the injurer’s standard of due care
should be scaled up to “high”. To determine the thresholds, we look for multiples of the cost
of care, a and b, such that low care and high care become more efficient than medium care:
(1+a)6 + 0.22×100 < (1+a)16 + 0.10×100
(1+b)26 + 0.02×100 < (1+b)16 + 0.10×100
which yields a > 20% and b < −20%. When the skill level of the injurer is sufficiently low
that the cost of taking each level of care rises by 20% or more relative to the average injurer,
the standard of care should be adjusted downwards; and when the skill is sufficiently high
that the cost of taking each level of care falls by 20% or more relative to the average injurer,
the standard of care should be adjusted upwards.
68 Korsmo criticizes the concept that unskilled injurers should take less care, ergo act in a
less prudent fashion. This theoretically sound notion, he argues, may lead to absurd results.
See Korsmo, supra note 20, at 316-17 ("The assumptions of the Standard Model actually
suggest that unskilled drivers should be allowed to drive faster than skilled drivers. They
suggest that unskilled drivers should be allowed to engage in more distractions than the
skilled. It would suggest that unskilled drivers should be allowed to drive with a higher
blood alcohol content than skilled drivers. Something is evidently amiss with the Standard
Model, when translated into actual legal prescriptions.").
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standards, although imposing more differentiated levels of care, impose less
differentiated costs of care on the various types of injurers. Under uniform
standards, the skilled and unskilled have to take the same level (“medium”)
but they bear differentiated costs of $8 and $24, respectively, to satisfy it.
Under personalized standards, they have to take different levels of care.
The skilled injurer has to take “high” care but can do so relatively cheaply
and incurs a cost of $13. The unskilled has to take “low” care but at a
relatively expensive manner and incurs a cost of $9. This illustrates a
general point: skill-based personalization counteracts people’s inherent
unequal skills, offsetting high cost of compliance with scaled down
standards.69
2. Risk-Based Personalization
Assume now that injurer types vary according to a different attribute:
the inherent riskiness of their conduct. For the same level of care, “safe”
injurers create lower risk than “dangerous” injurers. For example, some
drivers create higher risks on the road, even when driving at the same
speed, because they have poor instincts relative to other drivers; some
doctors create higher risks in performing medical procedures, even when
they use the same tools and procedures, because they are less experienced
and knowledgeable than other doctors (note that experience and knowledge
in some occasions, and for some tools and procedures, might affect
skillfulness, as we demonstrated in the previous section, but in some other
occasions, and for some other tools and procedures, might affect riskiness).
Again, we assume that injurers’ riskiness is distributed randomly, anywhere
on a continuum between safe and dangerous. Specifically, relative to the
representative injurer, safe injurers impose a risk that is 50% lower,
whereas dangerous injurers impose a risk 50% higher.70 Table 3
summarizes the care choices for the safest and for the most dangerous
injurers:

69

For further discussion of this last point, see infra Section III.B.1.
It should be noted that variation according to risk of harm could be captured also as
variation according to cost of care. If care is defined as the cost to achieve a given reduction
in the probability of accident, then the two attributes – skill and riskiness – would be
synonymous. Thus, presenting the case of personalization according to risk of harm does not
add a new theoretical insight, but merely replicates the effect described in the case of
personalization according to cost of care. It is present here nevertheless in order to set the
stage for the legal applications. The mathematical similarities between the two forms of
variations have been noted in previous writings on the topic. See SHAVELL, supra note 15, at
73 ("reference will be made, for simplicity, only to differences in parties' cost of taking care,
although what will be said will plainly bear equally on differences in the effectiveness of
their exercise of care"); Korsmo, supra note 20, at 292 ("From a purely mathematical
perspective, the distinction between the two scenarios is, indeed, seemingly
inconsequential"). Korsmo nevertheless devotes a significant portion of his article to an
analysis of the differences between the two variations, and suggests a method for
determining which one should be applied. Id. at 320-37.
70
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Cost of
Care

Low
Medium
High

$6
$16
$26

Probability of Harm
Safe
11%
5%
1%

Dangerous
33%
15%
3%
TABLE 3

21
Expected Social
Cost
Safe
Dangerous
$17*
$39
$21
$31
$27
$29*

Notice again that the average of safe and dangerous injurers is exactly
the representative injurer depicted in Table 1. But the optimal personalized
standards are different than the uniform standard. The lowest social cost is
obtained when safe injurers take “low” care and dangerous injurers take
“high” care.71 Relative to the most efficient uniform standard (“medium”),
social costs are reduced: If, for example, injurers are either safe or
dangerous with equal likelihood, the expected social cost under a
personalized standards regime will be $23 (average of $17 and $29)—
lower than under a uniform standards regime ($26).
This result, too, is intuitive. Injurers who create lower risks should
take lower care.72 It pays to impose higher burdens on the more risky actors
since any additional burden would produce more risk-reduction for the
high-risk actor than for the low-risk actor. Thus, the high-risk driver with
the poor instincts should take more care than the driver with the sharper
instincts. Similarly, the high-risk doctor with less experience and
knowledge should take more care than the more experienced and
knowledgeable doctor (at least if taking the additional care is equally costly
for the two doctors). Notice, however, that in terms of the distribution of
burdens, we get an opposite effect to the one we saw under skill-based
personalization. Risk-based personalized standards impose more
differentiated costs on the different types of injurers than uniform
standards. Under uniform standards, the safe and dangerous types bear the

More generally, if injurers’ riskiness varies anywhere between the +50% and −50% range,
there is a threshold of riskiness above which injurer’s standard of care should be scaled up
to “high,” and another threshold of riskiness below which the injurer’s standard of care
should be scaled down to “low”. To determine the thresholds, we look for multiples of the
probability of harm, s and t, such that low care and high care become more efficient than
medium care:
6 + (1+s)0.22×100 < 16 + (1+s)0.10×100
26 + (1+t)0.02×100 < 16 + (1+t)0.10×100
which yields s < −0.167 and t > 0.25. When the probability of harm at every level of care is
scaled down by 16.7% or more relative to the representative injurer, the standard of care
should be adjusted downwards; and when the probability of harm is scaled up by at least
25%, the standard of care should be adjusted upwards.
72 Korsmo illustrates this point by presenting a graph showing the accident costs for each
level of care for both the skilled and unskilled injurers. As the former's costs are lower, they
intersect with the ascending precaution costs at an earlier stage, leading to the conclusion
that skilled injurers should take less care. See Korsmo, supra note 20, at 323-24.
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same cost of $16 to meet the “medium” standard of care. Under
personalized standards, they have to bear costs of $6 and $26,
respectively.73
3. Self-Personalization
The reason uniform standards are not as efficient as personalized
standards is the incentive they provide injurers to abide even by inefficient
standards of care. Injurers have this incentive because of what is known as
the “discontinuity” feature of negligence law: that the failure to meet the
standard—even a small margin of departure—would give rise to full
liability for the entire harm suffered by the victim.74 Thus, even when
injurers recognize the standard to be inefficiently tailored to their skill or
riskiness, as the uniform standard would often be, they nevertheless abide
by it and incur inefficient precaution costs, to avoid the even greater lump
sum liability.
There is, however, an important caveat to this “discontinuity” feature.
If failure to meet the standard of care results only in incremental liability—
only for the additional harm due to the gap between actual care and due
care—the incentive to abide by an inefficient standard of care is attenuated.
An injurer might prefer to disregard the standard and assume such
incremental liability. Such an injurer would take efficient care and pay a
little extra in liability.75 Accordingly, the distortion arising from uniform
standards is not as large as our analysis above stated, and the benefit of
shifting to personalized standards is correspondingly smaller.76
Nevertheless, and despite the self-correcting mechanism of injurers
73

For further discussion of this last point, see infra Section III.B.1.
This discontinuity and its behavioral consequences were originally explained in Robert D.
Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 79, 80-89 (1982).
Cooter later explained that this discontinuity is due to incomplete information available to
the courts or the probabilistic nature of the causal connection. Robert D. Cooter, Punitive
Damages for Deterrence: When and How Much?, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1143, 1155 (1989).
75 Mark Grady and Marcel Kahan have demonstrated that the discontinuity of liability, as
well as the risk of burdening the negligent injurer with liability for more than the harm he
caused, completely disappear when causation rules are properly applied so that the injurer is
liable only for those harms that would not have been created had he behaved reasonably.
Mark F. Grady, A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence, 92 YALE L.J. 799, 812-13
(1983); Marcel Kahan, Causation and Incentives to Take Care under the Negligence Rule,
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 427, 427-29 (1989).
76 Landes and Posner were the first to note that under a uniform standard of care rule,
injurers with very high costs of taking care would not comply with the uniform standard but
choose instead the standard of care which is efficient for them. LANDES & POSNER, supra
note 14, at 125. Schwartz furthers this notion by dividing the group of high-cost injurers
who choose not to comply with the uniform standard into two sub-groups: one which
chooses to engage in the activity and one which refrains from doing so, as the benefits it
derives are exceeded by costs of care and costs of harm. This result is viewed by Schwartz
as an advantage for the uniform standard over the subjective one, as it creates "selfenforcing incentives for optimal behavior in deciding whether to engage in the activity".
Schwartz, supra note 17, at 249-50.
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ignoring inefficient uniform standards, we now show that such selfcorrection will not always occur and therefore personalized standards
continue to have a systematic efficiency advantage.
Consider, first, skill-based variation among injurers. We saw that
skill-based personalized standards would require unskilled injurers to take
“low” care and the high skilled injurers to take “high” care, and we argued
that these are improvements relative to the “medium” care that all injurers
take under the uniform standards regime. But would injurers indeed abide
by the “medium” care standard under a uniform standards regime?
Not necessarily. To be sure, skilled injurers would. For them, the
“medium” care standard is a boon. It is cheaper than the more efficient
“high” care personalized standard. The skilled would be delighted to
qualify for a liability safe harbor by investing less than efficient. But
unskilled injurers would have a different incentive. They would choose to
disregard the inefficiently burdensome “medium” standard, even if this
means that they would be found liable. For the unskilled, taking the
efficient “low” level of care at a cost of $9 would create some exposure to
liability. But not for all harms: they would be liable only for harms that are
due to the difference between taking “low” and “medium” care. Since the
shift from “medium” to “low” raises the expected harm from $10 to $22,
the expected liability of the unskilled who ignore the “medium” standard
and take “low” care is only $12 (and not $22, as we previously assumed).
For them, taking “low” care at a cost of $9 and incurring the expected
liability of $12, for a total cost of $21, is cheaper than incurring no liability
by satisfying the “medium” care standard at a cost of $24.
Here, the advantage of personalized standards is diminished because
some unskilled injurers would be self-driven to take the efficient care level,
even under a uniform standard. This is a general observation: any time the
idiosyncratic cost of care to injurers is high enough to justify a lower
personalized standard, this injurer would also have the incentive to ignore
the uniform standard and take a lower level of care. In other words, the
unskilled injurer would always self-personalize.77 The advantage of
personalized standards is then solely due to their effect on the upper side of
the distribution of injurers—the skilled injurers—who otherwise are happy
to satisfy a uniform standard and take what is for them inefficiently low
care.
The same one-sided self-personalization occurs in the case risk-based
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More generally, in the numerical example of Table 2, unskilled injurers have an incentive
to self-personalize if:
(1+a)6 + (0.22 – 0.10)×100 < (1+a)16
Thus, anytime unskilled injurers have a cost that is at least 20% higher than the
representative injurer, they would self-personalize and take “low” care. This, recall, is also
the cost threshold that justifies a reduction of the standard of care from “medium” to “low.”
We can conclude that the incentive to self-personalize for the unskilled occurs if and only if
it is efficient.
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variations across injurers. Once we relax our assumption that injurers abide
by the standard of care, and instead assume that injurers do what is less
costly for them and that they bear incremental liability (no "discontinuity"),
then again some injurers will ignore the inefficient uniform standard—they
will self-personalize and behave efficiently. Specifically, safe injurers will
ignore what is for them an inefficiently high uniform standard. Taking the
personally efficient “low” care, at a cost of $6, and bearing the expected
liability of $6 (the difference between the actual expected harm of $11 and
the expected harm of $5 that would have resulted had he abided by the
required “medium” standard of care) is less costly for the safe injurer than
incurring no liability by satisfying the “medium” care standard at a cost of
$16.78 Here, too, the advantage of personalized standards arises only from
their effect on dangerous injurers. These dangerous types would be content
to meet the “medium” level of care required under the uniform standards
regime, rather than the costlier “high” level of care under a personalized
regime. Personalization corrects this distortion.
4. Summary
We examined the efficiency of shifting from uniform to personalized
standards, in environments in which injurers vary across two harm-relevant
dimensions: skill in taking care and underlying propensity to impose risks.
There are other dimensions along which standards can be differentiated (for
example, the magnitude of harm), but the discussion above already
demonstrates several basic insights that apply to all cases. First,
differentiating the standards can improve incentives for care. If information
is available about the different risks and prevention costs, and if injurers
can anticipate the differentiated standards they face, personalized standards
are more efficient than average standards.
Second, the examples above draw out some basic principles in the
design of personalized standards. Should injurers who impose a higher
expected harm face stiffer standards? Upon first reflection, one might
intuitively conjecture that such harmful injurers should always be
confronted with higher standards of care. The analysis shows, however,
that this intuition is only partially valid. We saw that risky injurers—who
impose higher probabilities of accidents at each level of care relative to
safe injurers—should indeed face higher standards of care. But we also saw
an effect in the opposite direction: unskilled injurers—who impose a
greater risk because they are less effective in taking care and can only
achieve accident prevention at higher cost—should face lower, not higher,
personalized standards relative to the skilled injurers. Skilled injurers are
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In a similar fashion, Korsmo argues that under the variation in which injurers differ by
riskiness it is the unusually skilled injurer who would find it too costly to adhere to the
reasonable person standard and would therefore abide by her lower subjective standard,
thereby creating a "pocket" of strict liability. See Korsmo, supra note 20, at 327-29.
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less harmful but should nevertheless face higher standards of care due to
their relative effectiveness.
We also saw that personalized standards impose a different cost of
compliance on different types of injurers. Here, too, it might be conjectured
that the distribution of burdens would exhibit more variance under a
personalized standards regime. But, again, this is not always so. When
injurers vary in their costs of care (skilled v. unskilled), personalized
standards can reduce, rather than increase, the disparity in the burdens of
compliance.
Finally, we examined the incentives of injurers to self-personalize—a
type of self-selection that might occur even under uniform standards, and
might lead injurers to take differentiated levels of care notwithstanding the
crude, uniform, legal standard. This would happen only if we assume
continuity—rather than discontinuity—of liability, namely, if we assume
that failure to take the required level of care exposes the injurer only to the
incremental losses caused by this failure, and not others. In this
environment of self-personalization, personalized standards continue to be
more efficient, but solely due to their effect in reducing the burden of care
upon some injurers.

B. Levels of Activity
A standard result in the economic analysis of negligence law is the
activity level distortion. When injurers conform to the standard of care they
bear only some but not the full social cost due to their activity (they bear
the cost of care but not the residual expected harm) and therefore engage in
excessive levels of activity.79 In this section we ask how the activity level
distortion would be affected by personalized standards of care. We make
two distinct observations. First, personalizing the standard of care
according to skill (but not risks) could further distort, rather than improve,
injurers’ activity levels. Second, we identify a novel regime that combines
both personalized and uniform standards, which improves both care and
activity levels.
1. Improving or Distorting Levels of Activity
We saw in section A above that the standard of care would generally
be higher the more skilled and dangerous the injurers are, exceeding the
average uniform standard for the upper half of the population of injurers.
How would that affect their levels of activity?
Raising the standard of care for some injurers reduces their activity
level distortion, while lowering it for others exacerbates this distortion. In
the example in Table 2, raising the standard for skilled injurers from
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SHAVELL, supra note 15, at 17-19.
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“medium” to “high” raises their cost of care from $8 to $13. At “medium”
care, the negative externality from their activity was $10 (the expected
harm which they do not have to bear). At “high” care, the negative
externality is only $2. Since it is this negative externality that drives the
activity level distortion, shrinking it from an absolute magnitude of $10 to
$2 reduces the distortion.
While standards are raised for skilled injurers, they are lowered for the
unskilled types, from “medium” to “low” care. Here, the activity level
distortion is aggravated. At “medium” care the negative externality from
the activity of the unskilled injurers was $10. At “low” care, it was $22. As
the externality rises from an absolute magnitude of $10 to $22, the
distortion grows.
Thus, under skill-based personalization, the unskilled are led to
engage in more undesirable activity, while the skilled are led to engage in
less. Commentators have long noticed one side of this result—the
increasingly inefficient activity levels by the unskilled—and invoked it as a
primary argument against personalization.80 If people who cannot take
effective care were only required to meet their low personalized standard,
others would be imperiled by the greater risk they impose. The neighbors
of the unskilled injurer, says Holmes, “accordingly require him, at his
proper peril, to come up to their standard, and the courts which they
establish decline to take his personal equation into account.”81 But what
they have not noticed is the other side of the coin: the increasingly efficient
activity levels by the skilled.
Still, in normal circumstances, the added inefficient risks posed by the
unskilled due to personalization more than offsets the improved activity
levels of skilled injurers.82 The reason is subtle. The activity distortion is
due to the expected harm that a standard-abiding injurer does not bear. The
more care an injurer takes, the lower this expected harm, but the marginal
reduction has a diminishing property. When the unskilled shifts from the
uniform to the personalized low care, the increase in expected harm is
greater in absolute value than the decrease that occurs when the skilled
shifts from the uniform to the personalized high care. As a result, the
overall distortion of activity under skill-based personalized standards
increases.
But not under risk-based personalization. Here, safe injurers take
Schwartz, supra note 17, at 246 (“A rule that only requires the injurer to take what is for
her optimal care while engaging in the activity cannot achieve the optimal result. Under
such a rule, some injurers who should not engage in the activity will nevertheless do so.”);
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 14, at 126 (noting that holding a child, being an individual
who cannot attain a high level of care, to the uniform standard provides incentives for his
parents to prevent him from driving, whereas an individualized standard might not create a
sufficient incentive to restrict said activity).
81 HOLMES, supra note 1, at 108.
82 This was the case in our numerical example: the increased externality for the unskilled
was $12 and the reduced externality for the skilled was only $8.
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lower care and thus engage in more inefficient activity (in our example in
Table 3, they now create uncompensated expected harm to victims of $11,
up from $5 under uniform standards). But dangerous injurers take higher
care and engage in less inefficient activity ($3 of uncompensated external
harm, down from $15). Because, all else equal, dangerous injurers create
larger harms, the effect of curbing their activity level more than offsets the
increase in activity by the safe injurers. As a result, the overall distortion of
activity under risk-based personalized standards decreases. Here, the
desirable effect of personalization on activity levels adds to their effect on
care levels to bolster the efficiency of the regime.
2. Activity Levels with Self Personalization
We concluded that personalized standards have a mixed effect on
activity levels. Relative to uniform standards, they produce two effects. On
the upside, personalized standards reduce the distortion in activity levels
for injurers who now face higher standards (skilled or dangerous injurers).
On the downside, they worsen the distortion for injurers who now face
lower standards (unskilled or safe injurers). We now argue that the
downside is actually smaller than what the analysis above suggested.
Return to environment in which injurers may self-personalize. We
showed in section A.3 above that under a uniform standard regime, in
which liability is only for harm caused by untaken care (“continuous”
liability), it would be rational for unskilled or safe injurers to ignore the
uniform standard (“medium”) and take instead the personally efficient care
(“low”). In this setting, personalized standards have a smaller distorting
effect on activity levels. To see this, consider the case of risk-based
personalization. Under uniform standards, the safe injurer’s activity level
would depend on whether he self-personalizes. If he doesn’t—if he abides
by the uniform standard—he takes “medium” care, he is not found liable,
and thus incurs a private cost of $16, and imposes an uncompensated
expected harm of $5. If, instead, the injurer does self-personalize, he takes
“low” care, he is found liable for the incremental harms that would have
been prevented had he taken “medium” care, and thus incurs a private cost
of $12 ($6 cost of “low” care plus $6 expected liability), and imposes an
uncompensated expected harm of $5. This illustrates a general pattern: selfpersonalization does not affect the size of the uncompensated harm the
injurer inflicts on victims ($5 either way), but it does reduce the private
cost of activity to the injurer. In other words, self-personalization does not
affect the magnitude of the activity level distortion, but it increases its
incidence. With self-personalization, more safe injurers (those whose
private benefit is between $12 and $16) engage in the activity and inflict
the externality.83
83

The same analysis shows that with self-personalization, more unskillful injurers engage in
the activity and inflict the externality than without self-personalization.
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Thus, once we allow for the possibility of self-personalization under
uniform standards, more injurers engage in the activity than we initially
calculated. This should be obvious—the only reason the injurer selfpersonalizes is to reduce the private cost of activity. This means that
moving to a regime of personalized standards imposes a smaller increase in
the activity level of safe and unskilled injurers than we otherwise
calculated. The activity-level downside of personalization is thus smaller.
3. A Hybrid Regime
Personalized standards have a downside: they bring about an increase
in the activity level of some injurers. Indeed, it is this concern that led
commentators to conclude that a uniform standards regime is superior.84
We now argue that this concern should not categorically trump the case for
personalized standards. A personalized standards regime can be designed to
apply only when it does not distort activity levels. We show that an
unambiguous improvement in both care and activity can be obtained if
personalization is done selectively.
Consider a “hybrid” regime in which each type of injurer faces a
standard that is the greater of the pure personalized standard and the onesize-fits-all uniform standard. Personalization, in other words, can only
operate to increase, but not to decrease, the standard of care. In the case of
skilled-based personalization (the example in Table 2), skilled injurers face
the “high” standard (the higher among {high, medium}—the optimal
personalized and the optimal uniform standards), whereas unskilled injurers
face the “medium” standard (the higher among {low, medium}). Under this
hybrid regime, skilled injurers would take more efficient care and activity
levels than they would under a pure uniform standards regime; and
unskilled injurers would take the same level of care and activity as they
would under a uniform standard regime. This regime is generally better
than uniform standards, due to the improvement in care and activity by the
skilled type. The same logic applies to the case of risk-based
standardization: under the hybrid regime the dangerous injurer will be
required to meet a high standard while the safe will be required to adhere to
a medium standard.

C. Victim Care
In this section we examine how personalization of injurers’ standards
of due care affect the efficiency of victim precaution. We assume, for the
purpose of this discussion, that victims are homogeneous. To be sure,
victims vary along many aspects as well, such that would also justify
personalization of standards of contributory care. The question in this
section, however, is different. Does the case for personalization of injurers’
84

SHAVELL, supra note 15, at 91.
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standards depend on its effect on victims' behavior?
If a victim can adjust her own level of care to the personalized
standard and the idiosyncratic conduct of each injurer, the case for
personalizing injurers’ standards of care would only be bolstered. Such
injurer-only personalization would improve not only injurers’ behavior, but
also victims’. For example, if pedestrians can adjust their precautions to the
different dangers that different drivers facing different standards of care
impose, a law that sets personalized standards for drivers would induce
pedestrians to vary their precautions efficiently. Facing skilled injurers who
take more care, victims would adjust their care downwards and save some
unnecessary precautions.
But what if victims have to set their level of care without observing
the personalized standards and behavior by injurers? What if, when a car is
approaching, the pedestrian cannot observe the skill and the standard of
care of the specific driver? Victims may observe the distribution of
injurers, and take a uniform level of contributory care that best responds to
this distribution of risk. In this setting, personalized injurer standards pose a
challenge. Rather than facing injurers who all take uniform care, victims
now interact with injurers who take varying levels of care. It would seem,
then, that in the personalized standards environment, victims would have a
more difficult optimization problem to solve—how to respond to a volatile
care environment. Given that some injurers take personalized low care,
victims might be best instructed to “play it safe” and take high uniform
care. If so, victims’ care would be less efficient. The analysis below shows
that this conjecture is not generally valid.
1. Skill-Based Personalization
We saw that under a uniform standard and in the absence of selfpersonalization, all injurers would take medium level of care (costing $8
and $24 to the skilled and unskilled, respectively), and the residual risk of
harm facing the victim would be 10%. We also saw that under a
personalized standards regime, the skilled injurer would be asked to take
high care (costing $13), leaving a residual risk of 2%; and the unskilled
injurer would be asked to take low care (costing $9), leaving a residual risk
of 22%.
Under a uniform standard regime, then, the victim faces the same risk
regardless of the injurer’s type—here, a 10% probability of accident. Under
a personalized standard regime for injurers, the victim faces a variance of
risks—here, either 2% or 22%. In which setting will the victim’s care be
more effective?
Assuming that injurer and victim care are strategic substitutes (more
care by one party makes it optimal to take less care by the other), the more
skilled the injurer the less care would be optimal for the victim to take. The
skilled injurer leaves a residual risk of only 2%, so there is less value to
additional precaution by the victim than when the injurer is unskilled and
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the residual risk is 22%. But if the victim’s care cannot be tailored (either
because the victim cannot know which injurer he faces or because
precautions are "lumpy" and cannot be varied across injurers), it is possible
that the overall contribution of the victim to accident prevention would be
diminished. Relative to the case of uniform standards, where all injurers
impose on the victim a 10% risk of uncompensated accidents, the victim
will now seek the most efficient response to an environment that contains
injurers of both high risks (22% chance of harm) and low risks (2%).
Depending on the relative frequencies of the two different risks, it may well
pay off to demand higher care from the victim. The benefit of raising care,
which accrues vis-à-vis the low-skill injurers may well outweigh the
wastefulness of this added care vis-à-vis the high-skill injurers. For
example, if different cars on the road posed differential risks, a potential
victim’s care might be too high vis-à-vis some cars and too low vis-à-vis
others, but it might be optimal to demand that victims respond to the high
risk imposed by a subset of injurers notwithstanding the redundancy of
such effort in relation to the low risk injurers.85
Note, however, that even if victims’ care is less efficient under a
personalized standards regime, the overall effect of bilateral care under a
personalized standards regime cannot be less efficient. We saw that
personalized standards unambiguously improve the efficiency of injurers’
care. Under a personalized standards regime that takes victim care into
account in designing injurers’ standards, it's always possible to achieve the
outcome of uniform standards, by unifying the different types of injurers’
standard of care. Thus, if the costs of personalized standards on victims'
care are higher than the benefits of personalized standards on injurers' care,
efficiency would require that all injurers stick to a uniform standard. After
all, the presence of victims and their care is a crucial factor in efficiently
personalizing the standards of care, as well as in whether to personalize
them. It is also possible, that given the tradeoff of personalization and
victims' care, personalization would be done partially. Thus, if
personalization, without taking into account victims' care, requires that
given their skillfulness some drivers will impose a risk of 30 and the others
a risk of 50, given victims' care, personalization might end up with the
former drivers allowed to impose a risk of 35, and the others a risk of 40.
2. Risk-Based Personalization
Victims' care would be unambiguously more efficient under a regime
that personalizes injurers’ standards of care according to the risk they pose.
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Self-personalization under uniform standards does not change any of these observations.
Under a uniform standard regime, an unskilled injurer may choose to disregard the uniform
standard of care and take “low” care, but since he is liable for some of the harm, his victim
does not need to take as high a level of contributory care as she would under a personalized
standards regime.
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We saw that under a uniform standard all injurers would take medium level
of care, but would impose different risks: 5% v. 15% residual probability of
harm by the safe and dangerous types, respectively. We also saw that under
a personalized standards regime, the safe injurer would be asked to take
low care, leaving a residual risk of 11%; and the dangerous injurer would
be asked to take high care, leaving a residual risk of 3%.
Here, the effect of personalized injurer standards over victims' care is
unambiguous and desirable. Despite the fact that different injurers are
asked to take different personalized care levels, victims overall face a less
disperse distribution of risk. Under uniform injurer standards, victims faced
actors who cause either 5% or 15% probability of harm, whereas under
personalized injurer standards the probabilities of harm are both lower and
less dispersed (11% and 3%). Since the efficiency of victim care depends
on the residual probability of harm, personalized standards allow victims to
confront a less erratic distribution of such probabilities. As injurers are
induced to behave in a way that compensates for their different inherent
risks, victims can take more efficient care.

D. Ex Ante Investment in Improving Private Characteristics
Personalized standards reflect injurers’ observable idiosyncratic
properties—individual traits that affect their ability to reduce the risk of
accidents. How do these traits form? The analysis so far assumed that
people vary exogenously, and that the law merely observes—but does not
influence—the development of personal traits. In this section we relax this
assumption. We assume instead that traits are determined by investments
that people make: drivers could improve their skills, for example, by taking
driving classes and training;86 doctors could also improve their skills, for
example by reading more professional materials and participating in more
conferences;87 Employers can acquire more sophisticated tools and train
their personnel to reach higher skill or pose lower risk to outsiders.
We ask whether such investments would be affected by personalized
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See, e.g., Lisa Dorn & David Barker, The Effects of Driver Training on Simulated Driving
Performance, 37 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 63, 68 (2005) ("It would appear that
professional driver training and experiences affects simulated driving performance with
trained drivers demonstrating a potentially safer driving style than untrained drivers").
Robert B. Isler et al., Effects of Higher-Order Driving Skill Training on Young,
Inexperienced Drivers’ On-Road Driving Performance, 43 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS &
PREVENTION 1818 (2011) (showing that young inexperienced drivers who receive training
aimed at improving skills such as situational awareness and hazard anticipation perform
significantly better at driving-related simulations).
87 See, e.g., Dave Davis et al., Impact of Formal Continuing Medical Education: Do
Conferences, Workshops, Rounds, and Other Traditional Continuing Education Activities
Change Physician Behavior or Health Care Outcomes? 282 JAMA 867, 867-74 (1999)
(analyzing previous studies concerning CME, continuing medical education, concluding that
there is some evidence that interactive, as opposed to didactic, CME sessions can effect
change in professional practice and, on occasion, health care outcomes).
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negligence law. Specifically, we address a powerful objection to
personalized standards—that they undermine injurers’ incentives to
improve. If injurers anticipate that such investments would in turn raise the
precaution burdens imposed upon them, their incentives to make the
investments would weaken.88 They might even be incentivized to take
action to diminish, rather than improve, their harm reduction traits.
1. Skill-Based Personalization
High skill warrants a high standard of care. We saw in Table 2 that
under a personalized standard regime, the unskilled injurer would face a
“low” standard (at a cost of $9) whereas the skilled injurer would face a
“high” standard (at a cost of $13). Imagine that each injurer begins as
unskilled, but that prior to interaction with the victim the injurer could
become skilled by spending a lump sum cost of k. At what levels of k
would it be socially desirable to spend it? At what levels would it be in the
private interest of the injurer to make this investment?
a. Personalized Standards
Social optimum. If the injurer remains unskilled, the optimal level of
personalized care would be “low” and the resulting social cost of his
activity would be $31. If, instead, the injurer becomes skilled, the optimal
level of care would be “high” and the social cost would be $15. Thus, the
social gain from investment in skill is 31 – 15 = $16. It is socially desirable
to make the investment in skill if k < $16.
Private Incentives. The unskilled injurer faces a cost of care of $9,
whereas the skilled injurer faces a cost of care of $13. Here, investing in
becoming skilled is privately undesirable: not only does the injurer enjoy
none of the savings such investment yields socially, but he is saddled with
a higher cost of compliance. This is a general problem. The injurer's
investment in skill improvement reduces his cost of taking care—a social
benefit that is also a private benefit. But it also leads to an upward
adjustment of the level of care—another social benefit but one that creates
a private loss. This suggests that not enough investment in human capital
would be made, and that – as conjectured above – skill-based personalized
standards undermine ex ante investment.
b. Uniform Standards with Full Compliance
Social optimum. Since the standard of care does not change for those
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Schwartz, supra note 17, at 254-57 (arguing that while a personalized standard would
yield optimal investments in the ability to take care if courts were to measure said
expenditure and take it into account, in the more feasible scenario where ex-ante
investments in skill are disregarded, injurers would not have a high enough incentive to do
so and would underinvest in the ability to avoid harm to victims).
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who become skilled, and assuming (for now) that injurers comply with the
optimal uniform standard (“medium”), the social value of the investment is
the reduced cost of compliance with the uniform standard, from $24 to $8.
The investment should be made if k < $16.
Private incentive. Under a uniform standard with full compliance, the
injurer who invests in skill recoups the entire social saving, reducing her
cost of compliance from $24 to $8. Here, investment would be optimal.
Since there is no accompanying increase in the standard, there is no
divergence between the private and social incentive to invest.89
This analysis demonstrates a robust observation. Skill-based
personalization destroys the incentives to invest in improved skills. Under a
uniform standards regime, investment is optimal because the investing
injurer captures the entire social surplus from the improved skill. In
contrast, under a skill-based personalized standards regime, the injurer does
not enjoy the full social surplus from the investment in reducing the cost of
care, and may even be worse off.
To be sure, the problem of distorted ex ante investment under a
personalized standards regime can be resolved if courts could monitor such
investment. If a court has enough information to set standards that reflect,
not existing skills, but the optimally acquired skills, injurers would be
prompted to make the optimal investment. If, for example, a doctor could
not invoke his low skill in defense against malpractice and would instead
be held to the optimally acquired skill, personalization would clearly
outperform a uniform standard. But the information burden is high: it is not
enough for the court to set a standard based on optimal hypothetical skill
across the entire population. For this to be a personalized standards regime,
the optimally invested skill would then have to vary by the idiosyncratic
investment traits of each injurer.
2. Risk-Based Personalization
High risk warrants a high standard of care. We saw in Table 3 that
under a personalized standard regime, the dangerous injurer would face a
“high” standard (at a cost of $26), whereas the safe injurer would face a
“low” standard (at a cost of $6). Imagine that in the absence of ex ante
investment, the injurer would be the dangerous type, and that it would take
an investment of k to become a safe type. At what levels of k would it be
89

If injurers self-personalize, it is socially desirable to make an investment under uniform
standards if k < 13, the unskilled injurer takes “low” care and imposes a social cost of $31,
whereas the skilled injurer takes “medium” care and imposes a social cost of $18. The
private incentive is the same – make the investment in skill if k < 13. Without the
investment, the unskilled injurer self-personalizes to “low” care and faces a cost of care of
$9 and liability of $12, for a total private cost of $21, whereas the skilled injurer takes
“medium” care and incurs a cost of $8. Here, too, investment is generally optimal. While the
level of care does increase with improved skill, the injurer enjoys the entire social benefit—
lower cost of care and the net reduction in expected harm.
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socially desirable to spend k? Privately undertaken?
a. Personalized Standards
Social optimum. If the injurer remains dangerous, the lowest social
cost of his activity, when he takes “high” care, is $29. If, instead, the
injurer invests in becoming safe, the lowest social cost, when he takes
“low” care, is $17. Thus, the social gain from the investment is 29 – 17 =
$12. It is worth to make the investment in safety if k < $12.
Private Incentive. The dangerous injurer faces the cost of “high” care
of $26, whereas the safe injurer faces the cost of “low” care of $6. The
injurer would make the investment if k < $20. Here, investing in safety is
privately desirable. In fact, the private value of the investment is greater
than the social value, suggesting that too much investment would be made.
The example exposes one side of a general problem of inefficient
investment, although the direction of the distortion may go either way (too
much or too little investment). The private value of lowering one’s
riskiness is the reduced cost of complying with the lower personalized
standard. But the social value contains an additional component beyond the
reduction in the cost of care, which is the change in expected harm. This
change in the expected harm is due to two factors. First, the expected harm
goes down because, all else equal, the safe injurer poses a lower probability
of accident. Second, the expected harm goes up because the safe injurer
takes lower care. In the example, the second effect was stronger than the
first, and so the expected harm caused by the safe injurer increased relative
to that of the dangerous injurer (from $3 to $11). This is why the private
incentive to invest was too high. But in other situations, the first effect
could be stronger than the second, in which case there is an additional
social benefit to the investment that is not captured by the injurer, and the
incentive to invest in safety under a personalized standards regime would
be too small.
b. Uniform Standards with Full Compliance
Social optimum. Since the standard of care does not change for those
who invest in becoming safer, and assuming that all injurers comply with
the optimal uniform standard (“medium”), the social value of investment is
the ensuing reduction in the probability of harm at the uniform level of
care, from 15% to 5% (and the expected harm from $15 to $5). It is worth
to make the investment if k < $10.
Private incentive. Under a uniform standard with full compliance, the
injurer who invests in becoming safer receives no benefit, as she would
have to continue and comply with the same standard at the same cost.
Accordingly, investments that are socially desirable are not made. Injurers
may gain other benefits from becoming less risky, not captured in the
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example, such as reduction of self-risks. Still, the point remains: uniform
standards generate too little investment.90
In comparison to personalized standards, the investment under a
uniform standards regime would be unambiguously lower. The reasons, as
we just saw, is that personalization allows the investing injurer to capture
some benefits of his investment.91

E. Summary
We compared two types of personalization—skill-based and riskbased—along four dimensions: care, activity, victim’s contributory care,
and ex ante investment. The main themes that emerged are the following:
1. Personalization improves injurers’ level of care.
2. The main distortions that personalization may cause are three:
excessive activity levels, costlier victim care, and weak incentives to
invest ex ante.
3. The activity level distortion applies to the unskilled and safe
injurers, and it is due to the lower personalized standards they face. It
does not apply to skilled and dangerous injurers; for them,
personalization reduces the activity level distortion that is otherwise
ingrained into a uniform standard negligence regime. Accordingly, a
one-sided application of the personalization regime—increasing the
standards of care for the skilled and risky injurers but no reduction
90

The same is true for uniform standards with self-personalization. Here, a safe injurer
ignores the uniform standard, takes “low” care and imposes a social cost of $17, whereas a
dangerous injurer meets the uniform standard and imposes a social cost of $31. Thus, it is
socially desirable for the injurer to make the investment to become safe if k < $14. The
private incentive is small. The injurer who invests in becoming safe enjoys a reduction of
private cost from $16 (the cost of meeting the “medium” standard of care) to $12 (the cost
of meeting the “low” standard of care, $6, plus the expected incremental liability of $6).
Thus, the injurer would make the investment if k < $4.
Another way to explain this distortion—too little incentive to invest ex ante in reducing
one’s riskiness—is by recognizing some positive social value of the investment, which the
injurer cannot expropriate. If the injurer does not invest in becoming safe, he takes
“medium” care and pays zero damages. If, instead, he does invest, he self-personalizes,
takes “low” care, and pays some damage. The investment creates a benefit for the victim, in
the form of some expected damages. Since the injurer does not internalize this benefit, his
investment is too low. This change creates benefits to victims which are not internalized by
injurers. Consequently, injurers have deficient incentives to become safe
91 At the same time, we cannot rule out the nagging possibility that the overinvestment
problem of personalized standards might be worse than the underinvestment problem of
uniform standards. In the example, if k < $12, the investment is efficient but would only be
made under a personalized standards regime. If $12 < k < $20 the investment is inefficient
but would still be made under a personalized standards regime. In this case, the overall cost
of accidents, inclusive of the cost of the ex ante investment, would be higher and less
efficient under a personalized standards regime. And, finally, if k > $20, the investment
would not be made under either regime, injurers would remain dangerous, and there will be
no difference between the two regimes.
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for the unskilled or dangerous—would unambiguously improve
injurers' activity level.
4. The victim care distortion applies only to skill-based
personalization and is due to the increased variance in risks that
victims face. Risk-based personalization, by contrast, reduces this
variance and may improve the efficiency of victim care. Therefore, a
personalization regime based solely on risks would unambiguously
decrease victim costs of care.
5. The ex-ante investment distortion applies mainly to skill-based
personalization; with risk-based personalization injurers typically
have more efficient incentives to invest in decreasing their riskiness
than under a uniform standard regime. Here, too, a personalization
regime based solely on risks would unambiguously improve injurers'
incentives to invest in reducing their harmfulness.
6. The gap in incentives between a personalized standard regime and
a uniform standard regime narrows once self-personalization under a
uniform standard regime takes place. Specifically, the gap narrows
with respect to the incentives of the unskilled and safe (who selfpersonalize under a uniform standard), but not with respect to the
skilled and risky (who do not self-personalize).

Table 4 summarizes our main conclusions (naturally, not all nuances
are captured by the table). Each of the four columns is a different regime,
distinguished by the type of personalization (skill v. risk) and the direction
of standard adjustment (upward v. downward). A “+” sign means that the
specific personalized standards regime is more efficient along that aspect
from uniform standards.
TABLE 4: Efficiency Effects of Personalization
Skilled: up

Unskilled:
down
+*
-

Dangerous:
up
+
+
+

Safe:
down
+*
+

1. Level of Care
+
2. Activity Level
+
3. Victim Care
4.
Ex
Ante
+
+
Investments
* Under the assumption of self-personalization, personalization has no effect
compared to uniform standard.

III. JUSTICE CONSIDERATIONS
The analysis in Part II identified the incentive effects of a personalized
negligence regime, and evaluated them along the total welfare metric.
While the overall effect is ambiguous, we nevertheless identified several
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clear advantages to personalized standards, suggesting that in a large set of
circumstances it is a superior regime. The article does not end here,
however, because two additional aspects need to be considered. One is a
feasibility aspect: do courts have the institutional capacity to implement
personalized standards? This will be taken up in Part IV below. The other
is a normative aspect that often plays a central role in evaluating tort law
doctrines—whether the rule is just. We offer in this Part a preliminary
analysis of the justice considerations which might be relevant to the
personalization of negligence law.

A. Corrective Justice
Corrective justice imposes primary duties on actors to refrain from
injuring others, and to repair injuries that were caused by the violation of
the primary duties.92 It mandates that the negligent injurer should
compensate the victim for her losses if by his wrongdoing he infringed on
his duty not to harm the victim (or to create unreasonable risk of harm), and
thus violated the equality between the parties.93 Compensation is aimed at
rectifying the injustice done by the wrongdoer to the victim.94
Under a prominent corrective justice account, what constitutes an
unreasonable risk created by the injurer toward the victim has to be
determined without regard to the burden of reducing the risks on the
injurer.95 Being negligent is not merely failing to take cost-justified care (as
it is in economic analysis of negligence, under the Hand formula). Rather,
and regardless of the cost, the injurer’s duty has to comport with a
reasonable conception of liberty and security for the victim.96 In this light, a
92

Theories of Tort Law, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2010) (available
online at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/tort-theories/#CorJus).
93 ARISTOTEL, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, 111-12 (David Ross trans., rev. ed. 1980).
94 ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 145-70 (1995) (discussing negligence law
under a corrective justice theory); JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 367-69 (1992)
(justifying liability for negligence by corrective justice). In recent years it was argued by
Benjamin Zipursky and John Goldberg, that tort law's goal is to allow a remedy for victims
of wrongdoing, rather than restoring them to the position they would have been in but for
the wrongdoing. For this theory, see Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse
in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 82–90 (1998); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C.
Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625, 1643 (2002); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil
Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695 (2003); John C.P. Goldberg, The
Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of
Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005).
95 See WEINRIB, id. at 147-52.
96 See Jules L. Coleman, Legal Theory and Practice, 83 GEO. L.J. 2579, 2603-04 (1995)
(arguing that an objective standard of care comports with a reasonable conception of liberty
and security). For a similar argument see Jared Marshall, On the Idea of Understanding
Weinrib: Weinrib and Keating on Bipolarity, Duty and Nature of Negligence, 19 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 385, 398 (2009-2010). For counter arguments, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Misunderstanding Ability, Misallocating Responsibility, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1055, 1057
(2003) (arguing that a subjective standard of care comports with corrective justice
rationales, and that "[b]y comparing the conduct of ordinary people to that of an idealized
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party may be held negligent even if the cost of untaken care is too high,
under a cost-benefit analysis.
If one accepts the irrelevance-of-cost premise, then skill-based
personalization would seem to conflict with corrective justice. An injurer’s
skill, as we defined it above, is primarily a measure of his burden in
reducing risks—the very factor this conception of corrective justice rejects.
An actor with relatively low skill should not be permitted to satisfy a more
lenient standard, and conversely, an actor with above average skills should
not face a higher standard.
We do not accept this irrelevance-of-cost premise. As argued by one
of us previously, even under a corrective justice account negligence and
unreasonable risks could not be meaningfully defined without considering
the burden of care imposed upon the injurer.97 If a technological shock
made it ten times cheaper to administer some care measure, doesn't the
victim’s interest in security entitle her to expect an increase in the amount
of care used to protect her? In fact, it is hard to see why the corrective
justice account would oppose a personalized increase in the standards of
care. Even if injurers should not be allowed to argue that because of their
low skills the "average" burden of care is too heavy for them and should be
reduced, victims should be allowed to argue that because of the injurer's
high skills the "average" burden of care is too lenient and has to be
increased.98
Finally, while the case for skill-based personalization might conflict
with some conceptions of corrective justice, the case for risk-based
personalization would only be bolstered by this normative framework. The
focus on the duty not to expose victims to unreasonable risk means, that
injurers whose conduct imposes relatively high risk should do more to
reduce it than injurers whose same conduct imposes a lower risk.
Otherwise, if both are held to the same standard, they would expose victims
to different levels of risk. Indeed, we saw in Part II that risk-based
personalization reduces the variance of risks created by injurers.99
Personalized standards therefore reduce to what should be considered an
anomaly under the corrective justice account, that some victims are
presented with greater uncompensated harms than others.

superhero, the law allocates fault where none exists and labels reasonable conduct as
unreasonable").
97 See Ariel Porat, Questioning the Idea of Correlativity in Weinrib's Theory of Corrective
Justice, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 161 (2001).
98 This counter-argument can be derived from the justification for ignoring the injurer's
burden of care: as Weinrib put it, the injurer should not be allowed to unilaterally draw the
line between his and the victim's rights. This justification does not necessarily imply that the
injurer with high skills should not do more than the injurer with the average skill to protect
the victim's rights. WEINRIB, supra note 94, at 152
99 Supra. Indeed, it might even happen—as we have demonstrated—that personalization
could make the risks created by the inherently more risky injurer lower than those created
by the inherently less risky one.
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B. Distributive Justice
Personalization has distributive consequences. First, by treating
different injurers differently, it raises questions of distributive justice across
injurers. Indeed, we saw that personalization may increase or decrease the
variance in costs of care borne by injurers. Such unequal allocation of the
burden of care among similarly situated injurers might be considered
unjust, violating the requirement to treat like cases alike.100 But is it? Are
injurers similarly situated if they have different skills or create different
risks? We address this question in subsection 1 below.
Second, personalization of standards of care changes the allocation of
accident costs between injurers and victims, trading victim harm for injurer
care. Low skill injurers, for example, are asked to take less care even
though this might result in higher harm. While justified under cost benefit
analysis, does this result conform to principles of distributive justice? Can
precautions and harm be treated at equal footing? Should the goal of
preventing harms be treated with priority over saving in precautions?101
These questions are the topic of sub-section 2 below.
1. Among Injurers
Personalization replaces a uniform one-size-fits-all standard with a
scheme that has higher variance. Engaged in the same conduct, different
injurers are asked to meet different standards. But the distributive impact of
this greater variance of standards depends on how it affects the distribution
of burdens.
Consider, first, skill-based personalization, which requires more
skilled injurers to take more care. The skilled have to meet more
burdensome standards, but at the same time they are able to meet any
standard at a lower private cost. (This, recall, is the very definition of
injurer skill: more impact for any $1 of care). Under a uniform standard
regime, both the skilled and unskilled are required to take the same level of
care, requiring the unskilled to spend more than the skilled. Raising the

100

TSACHI KEREN-PAZ, TORTS, EGALITARIANISM AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 5-7 (2007)
(explaining that the distributive justice theory is based on formulation of proportion between
the participants, regarding their possession of the criteria for distribution. Thus, it is
seemingly unjust to impose a different standard of care on two similarly situated injurers).
For a different argument stating that a subjective standard of care can promote distributive
goals see Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal
Rules, and Insurance, 56 TAX LAW REV. 157, 238 (2003).
101 Gregory C. Keating, Pricelessness and Life: An Essay for Guido Calabresi, 64 MD. L.
REV. 159, 178-80 (2005) (stating that legal rules cannot trade severe injuries for trivial
precautions borne by others) [hereinafter Keating, Pricelessness]. For similar arguments see
also Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN.
L. REV. 311, 355 (1996); Dilan A. Esper & Gregory C. Keating, Putting "Duty" in Its Place:
a Replay to Professors Goldberg and Zipursky, 41 LOY. L. A. L. REV. 1225, 1248 (20072008).
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standard for the skilled and lowering it for the unskilled counteracts this
unequal cost-burden and contributes to a more equal allocation of burdens.
This argument may seem to hold greater merit when skills are
distributed exogenously and are uncontrolled by injurers, as in the case of
inherited physical and cognitive abilities that are determined by nature.
There is some unfairness in the distribution of endowments and it is offset
by graduated duties. But what if skills are acquired by injurers through
deliberate investment in human capital and precaution aids, as examined in
section II.D above? Should high-skill injurers be denied the cost saving
they worked hard to acquire? Should non-investing low-skill injurers be
rewarded with a lower standard and lower burden? A possible defense of
personalization even along the dimension of deliberately acquired skills
would focus on overall progressivity of social policy. Often, individual
skills—even if acquired by deliberate investment—are also correlated with
other privileges and advantages in society at large. If skilled people are on
average better off, if they are more likely to tap into socially funded
opportunities, if social institutions allow them disproportionate access to
the opportunities to invest in skill and to benefit from their acquisition—
then an offsetting burden to meet heightened standards would not violate an
overall scheme of distributive justice, and may well improve it.102
The picture is exactly the opposite when we evaluate the fairness of
risk-based personalization. Recall that with such personalization there is
more—not less—variance in costs of care than under a uniform standard
regime. Is this variance justified by distributive justice considerations? Is it
justified that the inherently risky injurers would be required to spend more
in reducing risks? As with variance in skills, to answer this question it is
important to know the reason for the variance in riskiness. If inherent risks
are the manifestation of natural characteristics, than greater variance in
costs of care due to personalization would not be supported by distributive
justice. All the more so if uncontrollable riskiness is correlated with lower
overall wealth or wellbeing.103 If instead, injurers are able to reduce their
inherent risks by investing money, time and efforts, rewarding such
investors with lower care burdens is appropriate. In this case, the greater
variance in the costs of care achieved through risk-based personalization
would be justified. But again, the picture might flip when the distribution
of advantages and burdens is viewed more broadly. As with acquired skills,
it is possible that those who were able to reduce their inherent riskiness
have also managed to systematically recoup more advantages and benefits
across various social activities, and are better off overall. Granting them yet
another advantage – lower standards of care – would violate distributive
justice.

102

See Seidelson, supra note 39, at 44-45 (explaining why a subjective standard of care is
also justified according to distributive justice principles).
103 Also, risky people may be injured more often and pay higher insurance.
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2. Victims versus Injurers
So far we have discussed distributive effects among injurers. Now we
turn to victims: are the effects of personalization on victims justified by
conceptions of distributive justice? Is victims' safety compromised and
placed at an inferior normative status relative to injurers' attributes?104
As we have seen, personalization raises the standard of care for skilled
and risky injurers. At the same time it decreases the standard of care for
unskilled and safe injurers. Victims of some injurers are therefore safer,
whereas victims of other injurers are less safe. Still, as long as victims are
equally likely to face all types of injurers, the greater efficiency of
personalized standards suggests that the overall shifting of losses to
victims—namely, only those losses that injurers are unfit to prevent—
conforms to the distributive goals of tort law.105
We cannot, however, make the stronger claim—that under
personalization victims face overall less risks and less uncompensated
losses. Skilled and risky injurers take more care and reduce risks, but
unskilled and safe injurers take less care and increase risks, relative to
uniform standards. This ambiguity remains even if under uniform standards
injurers self-personalize. Recall that under uniform standards, unskilled and
safe injurers may choose to ignore the standard, take lower (and more
efficient) care, and bear negligence liability. Compared to a personalized
standards regime, under a uniform standard with self-personalization
victims incur two conflicting effects. On the downside, they receive less
care from the skilled or risky injurers. On the upside, they receive full
compensation from the unskilled and safe injurers who self-personalize and
are found to be negligent. It is impossible to determine unambiguously
which effect dominates.
As a caveat, it is possible to apply a partial personalization regime that
would also make victims unambiguously better off, and thus not conflict
with a victim-oriented fairness baseline. Clearly, victims would be better
off if personalization is applied asymmetrically, raising the standard of care
only for the skilled and risky, and preserving the uniform average standard
for the rest. They would enjoy higher safety due to higher care taken by
some injurers, without the downside of lower safety (or lower
compensations) otherwise.
IV. BROADENING PERSONALIZATION
We now turn to more a pragmatic question: is it realistic to expect
courts to implement personalized standards, and for people to correctly
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Keating, Pricelessness, supra note 101, at 179-80 (arguing that a victim's severe injuries
should not be tradable for an injurer's abilities to take precautions).
105 Logue & Avraham, supra note 100 (arguing that a subjective standard of care may
conform to distributive justice principles).
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anticipate these burdens? Our discussion so far showed that
personalization—if done correctly—can provide efficiency and fairness
gains which current law does not realize. But does it create informational
burdens too heavy for the legal system to bear? Can courts do what has
become common practice in many industries and utilize more fine data to
set personalized standards of care? If so, how far should personalization
go?
We argue in this Part that any personal information that is feasible for
courts to reliably collect and for individual actors to reliably foresee should
be factored into personalized standards. This includes information about
individual characteristics, including physical, genetic, cognitive, and
emotional, as well as information about individual resources and past
experience. The information could be collected through standard “lowintensity” methods such as past records, observable traits, tests and screens.
The information could also be collected through “high-intensity” methods
such as Big Data and machine learning prediction methods. While the
feasibility of some of these methods may still be limited by technological
and legal constraints, our goal is to demonstrate the enormous potential that
non-personalized negligence law is threatening to leave untapped.
While the amount of relevant information may be large and growing,
the implementation of personalized standards is limited by several
constraints. First, courts may be only partially able to translate personalized
data into individual standards, lacking the actuarial expertise to make the
fine-tuned continuous adjustments. This problem can be solved, we argue,
by a regime of qualitative step-adjustments in the standards—similar to the
sentencing guidelines approach in criminal law. Second, personalized
standards can have the desirable deterrent effect only to the extent that
actors can anticipate them. Calibrating the standards too finely along a
continuous range could create uncertainty among actors, which itself
distorts care choices.106 We argue, perhaps counter-intuitively, that it would
often be easier for injurers to anticipate personalized standards than
uniform ones, because they know more about their own characteristics than
about the general distribution of characteristics in society.
Some of the evidentiary proposals presented in this Part may strike
readers as a fantasy. They create a different model of information
acquisition by courts than the traditional rules of evidence and civil
procedure. We nevertheless present these ideas as a benchmark for
discussion. Our argument, in a nutshell, is that if procedural and ethical
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John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with
Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984) (analyzing the inefficient effects of uncertain
legal standards). Calfee & Craswell have further developed their analysis in a later article.
See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 279 (1986); See also Omri Ben-Shahar, Should Products Liability Be Based
on Hindsight?, 14 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 325 (1998) (exploring the ramifications of determining
product liability in hindsight, noting the uncertainty effects it creates upon manufacturers).
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rigidities can be overcome, the law could make advances similar to ones
made in areas like medicine, insurance, marketing, or education. There is a
large potential for improving the deterrent effect of negligence law, without
sacrificing (and perhaps also promoting) important notions of corrective
and distributive justice.

A. Implementing Personalized Standards: Gradual Personalization
The first question any personalization regime has to address is the
degree of granularity. A more granular regime distinguishes individuals
more finely and adjusts the standards based on more factors, sensitive to
more kinds of information. At the extreme, the most granular regime
requires courts to tailor the standard of care for each injurer along a
continuum, shifting it up or down in response to every bit of individualized
information ("the continuum mode of personalization.")
Choosing the optimal granularity of a personalized standards regime is
a problem of information costs. First, it might be costly for courts to collect
the information necessary to tailor different standards of care for each and
every injurer. It is cheaper and easier for courts to avoid the informationrich inquiry of personalized standards and implement a one-size-fits-all
uniform standard. Even if personal information is collected and presented
at trial, there are limits to courts' abilities to process the available data and
translate it accurately into adjustments of the standard of care (and even
more so when jurors are involved). This requires actuarial expertise that
courts often lack.
Second, like courts, injurers facing personalized standards need to take
into account personal traits when trying to anticipate and perform their
duties of care and understanding how courts would require them to behave.
Is it realistic to expect injurers to make such informed assessments? Can
they adapt their behaviors to the standard of care they are required to meet
under the continuous mode? Are uniform standards easier to anticipate?
It might seem, intuitively, that the information problems faced by
courts and by injurers in a personalized standards regime are similar. Since,
by definition, personalized standards rely on more richly tuned and finely
partitioned information, they inflict on all participants in the regime,
including courts (ex post) and injurers (ex ante), a more daunting
informational task. But upon further reflection we claim that this conjecture
is false. In fact, it is easier for injurers to anticipate what is reasonable for
them, given their personal characteristics, than to extrapolate what is
reasonable for the average person in society. We know our dangerousness
and skill better than we know the societal distributions of these traits, and
we can act intuitively upon this self-knowledge. True, people may learn or
infer the uniform societal standards without having to know the exact
distributions over the entire society, by observing past cases and by
following societal norms. But in a regime that relies on ex post standards
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(which, unlike ex ante rules, do not articulate bright line commands) such
learning of what the uniform standard requires is slow and imperfect.
Personalized standards, by contrast, require no learning, as much as they
harness information injurers already have about themselves.
The problem for injurers is that while they may have a good sense of
what individually optimal behavior is given their idiosyncratic traits, they
still need to anticipate the personalized standards that an imperfect court
would impose on them. Even if courts set personalized standards that are
unbiased, their tailoring would have some degree of inaccuracy (random
errors). Having to anticipate such imperfect tailoring of personalized
standards, injurers’ informational burden would be compounded.
Thus, it is likely that a continuous mode of personalization—under
which every bit of personalized information can shift the standard
incrementally—would be too costly: too costly for courts to implement
case by case; and too costly for injurers to anticipate the patterns of courts’
judgments.
To reduce these information problems, personalized standards would
have to be set along a scheme of discrete qualitative steps—what we call
“gradual personalization.” According to this scheme, courts would have to
choose among a limited number of standards – for example, a three-step
scheme of high, medium and low– and pigeon-hole injurers into these
groups. Gradual personalization is similar to a sentencing guidelines
scheme that provides qualitative step-like adjustments to judgments based
on case specific characteristics, but stops short of the continuous mode. For
example, while drivers’ skills and dangerousness may vary along a
continuum, justifying driving their cars at a different speed under similar
circumstances of the road and traffic, the gradual personalization scheme
would require them to drive at low, medium or high speeds. Thus, at
similar situations, one driver would be expected to drive no more than
15mph, another driver up to 20mph, while a third driver would be allowed
to reach 25mph.
Gradual personalization would certainly be an improvement compared
to the current uniform standards rule. It is more practical and easy to
implement than a pure personalization rule. And the degree of granularity
(the number of steps) would depend on the variance of personal attributes
and the costs for courts of making finer personal determinations, and for
injurers of anticipating these partitions.

B. Which Personal Information?
Another aspect of accuracy, apart from granularity as discussed above,
addresses the types of information a personalized standards regime
incorporates. It seeks to distinguish people according to their tendencies to
create risks and their capabilities to prevent them, but which information
should be drawn upon? Which individual characteristics should be the basis
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for personalized negligence law?
Our discussion in this section is intended to begin charting the
informational potential that personalized standards could unleash. This
includes physical and genetic information about people as well as
personality information including cognitive skills and emotional aspects. It
could be learnt either from general data and statistics relating to the
injurer's attributes such as age, gender, education and profession, or from
personal information collected directly through medical, physical or
psychological tests and from past behavior which resembles the behavior in
question. It could also be inferred from past behavior which is different
from the behavior in question but could reveal capabilities which are
relevant to the assessment of the behavior in question.
The information relevant to setting personalized standards can be
collected through traditional methods such as public records or examination
scores, but it could also be collected from large digital databases—Big
Data. The term Big Data refers to databases with enormous quantities of
information.107 Data mining—the process of discovering human behavior
patterns in these large-scale databases—allows predictions of future
behavior across many dimensions. Big Data analysis can predict various
risks, personal characteristics, preferences, and many other aspects relevant
in the determination of optimal legal standards.
1. Physical Characteristics
Different people impose different risks on others based on their
physical characteristics. For example, a short driver might create higher
risks than tall drivers toward both other drivers and pedestrians, because
she might only have a narrow vision of the road;108 drivers with impaired
vision are likely to impose higher risks on others,109 and the same is true
with respect to drivers who have hearing difficulties.110 Higher risks might
107

Liane Colonna, A Taxonomy and Classification of Data Mining, 16 SMU SCI. & TECH. L.
REV. 309, 329 (2013) (explaining how data mining works); Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note
9, at 1435 (discussing the usage of Big Data, explaining how it can be used for personalizing
default rules).
108 See DOBBS, supra note 29, § 119 n. 10 (citing Mahan v. State, 172 Md. 373, 191 A. 575
(1937), which held that a driver whose short stature imposed limitations on her vision is
expected to exercise "greater watchfulness" to avoid injuring others). Few car
manufacturers, being aware of short drivers' visibility problem, offer some models for
shorter people. See Jerry Kronenberg, 5 Best Cars for Short Drivers, THE STREET (Sep. 21
2013) www.yahoo.com/autos/s/5-best-cars-for-short-drivers-213753032.html; Christina
Rogers, Better Cars for Short and Tall Drivers, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Oct. 9, 2013)
www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304626104579123411103492676 .
109 Karlene Ball et al., Visual Attention Problems as a Predictor of Vehicle Crashes in Older
Drivers, 34 INVEST OPHTHALMOL VIS SCI 3110 (1993) (showing that older drivers with
severe sensitivity loss in both eyes have twice the number of crashes than older drivers with
normal visual field sensitivity).
110 Louise Hickson et al., Hearing Impairment Affects Older People's Ability to Drive in the
Presence of Distracters, 58 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN GERIATRICS SOCIETY 1097 (2010)
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justify demanding more precautions from the actor creating the risks.
Research conducted in the field of "system design" of planes and
automobiles indicated a relationship between certain human traits and the
capabilities to perform a certain task. For example, a research conducted by
Korteling showed—quite unsurprisingly—that older drivers (61-73 year
old) and drivers with brain injury history have significantly longer reaction
time than younger drivers (21-43 year old).111 Age is also a significant
factor in predicting drivers' ability to avoid lane crossing112 and their
braking response time.113 In our example above, a 65 year old man
probably imposes higher risk on others than the average 45 year old driver
and his reaction time is probably longer than that of the average driver. The
higher risk would optimally require him to drive slower, while the longer
reaction time might justify relaxing the “reaction time standard.”
2. Cognitive and Emotional Characteristics
Risk creation is also linked to mental and cognitive capabilities and
traits. For example, a driver with high spatial abilities can better avoid
dangerous situations and should face an elevated standard that would
prompt her to utilize more of her skill.114 Human traits such as impulsivity,
risk taking and sensation seeking increase the likelihood of a person to
engage in dangerous activities, thereby imposing risks on others.115
Therefore, a sensation seeking doctor might be more prone to appraise risks
as lower than a low sensation seeking doctor. We might want to require the
former doctor—or its employer—to take extra precautions before taking
crucial decisions involving risk estimation.
A conscientious person tends to be more organized and prefer planned

(showing that people with moderate to severe hearing impairment had significantly poorer
driving performance in the presence of distracters than those with normal or mild hearing
impairment).
111 J.E Korteking, Perception-Response Speed and Driving Capabilities of Brain-Damaged
and Older Drivers, 36 HUMAN FACTORS 27, 27-43 (1994), in VALERIE J. GAWRON, HUMAN
PERFORMANCE MEASURE HANDBOOK 30 (2000) (describing experiments regarding reaction
time tasks and driving tasks that were conducted to identify variables that may be sensitive
to the effects of aging).
112 J.P Szlyk, W. Seiple & M. Viana, Relative Effects of Age and Compromised Vision on
Driving Performance, 37 HUMAN FACTORS 430, 430-36 (1995) in GAWRON, id. at 32
(describing experiment that was held in order to determine the effects of age and
compromised vision on driving skills).
113 Id. at 31 (showing that the older groups had poorer driving-related skills than the younger
groups on simulator missions).
114 K. Wochlnger & D. Boehm-Davis, The Effects of Age, Spatial Ability, and Navigational
Information on Navigational Performance, FHWA-RD-95166 (1995) (showing that
navigational ability, which is linked to car accidents' involvement, declines with age due to
decrements in spatial ability and perceptual speed).
115 Marvin Zuckerman & D. Michael Kuhlman, Personality and Risk Taking: Common
Biosocial Factors, 68 JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY 999, 1000 (2000) (explaining that some
personality traits such as sensation seeking, are relevant to the risk-taking inclination).
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rather than spontaneous behavior.116 This tendency has a clear implication
on the way different people perform their tasks and the precautions they
could take to reduce risks. It might be reasonable to have different demands
and expectations from actors who tend to be planners (and maybe more
responsible, organized and reliable117) and from actors who are
spontaneous. Those demands and expectations might change across
activities. Sometimes we might demand from actors who are less organized
to take more precautions to decrease risks (in the case of doctors, for
example), while sometimes the less organized and more spontaneous actor
might be the one more capable to react to unexpected circumstances (say,
unexpected risks in the road) and that might affect the standard of care
most suitable for him.
Reaction time while performing a dangerous task depends, we saw, on
physical aspects, but also on psychological factors such as fatigue, aging,
brain damage history and use of drugs.118 Therefore, a surgeon who suffers
from sleep deprivation, is likely to impose higher risk to patients than other
surgeons. Also, when the time of performing a task increases—such as
when the operation on a patient becomes longer—the surgeon's fatigue
increases, resulting in significant increase in reaction time and in risk to
patients.119 This might justify an increase in the standard of care from
doctors who suffer from sleep deprivation, for example by requiring them
to take longer breaks in extended shifts, or if this is impossible, requiring
them to take more precautions as the operation progresses. And,
conversely, when taking a break or taking other precautions is impractical,
it might be justified to relax—rather than elevate—the standard of care. As
urgency rises and care becomes costlier, the optimal level should
correspondingly adjust.
Big Data can be a reliable source for learning about injurers' cognitive
skills and intelligence, sometimes more than direct exams, because it is not
as manipulable (people may underperform on exams if high scores raise
their burden of care). For example, according to some studies, intelligence
and cognitive abilities can be predicted to a high degree of accuracy based
on records of users’ Likes on Facebook. The best predictors of high
intelligence include "likes" to the pages “Thunderstorms,” “The Colbert

116

Daniele Quercia et al., Our Twitter Profiles, Our Selves: Predicting Personality with
Twitter, in PROC. SOCIALCOM/PASSAT 180 (2011) (analyzing the relationship between
personality and different types of Twitter users).
117 Jennifer Golbeck, Cristina Robles & Karen Turner, Predicting Personality with Social
Media, in CHI '11 EXTENDED ABSTRACTS ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 253,
254 (2011) (presenting a method of predicting human personality through the information
available on their Facebook profile).
118 GAWRON, supra note 111, at 41 (indicating that reaction time is sensitive to fatigue,
aging, brain damage and use of drugs).
119 W. C Harris et al., Performance, Workload, and Fatigue Changes Associated with
Automation, 5 INT'L J. OF AVIATION PSYCHOL. 169, 169-85 (1995) in GAWRON, supra note
111, at 41 (discussing the influence of workload and fatigue in a multitask environment).

48

91 NYU LAW REVIEW (forthcoming 2016)

Report,” “Science,” and “Curly Fries,” whereas low intelligence was
indicated by “Sephora,” “I Love Being A Mom,” “Harley Davidson,” and
“Lady Antebellum”.120 Similarly, a person's level of education can be
inferred by analyzing search terms and web pages accessed by her,121
although in most cases, for personalizing the standard of care, the level of
education can be more easily learnt from direct resources. Or, there is some
evidence that users with different personalities prefer different website
categories. For example, people with a tendency to be well-organized
prefer websites such as kodak.com, education.com, exct.net, ecnext.com,
ecollege.com.122 The tendency of a person to be well-organized could be a
consideration in setting a personalized standard of care for him. 123 Big Data
analysis can also help courts identify risk-taking inclination, which could
be essential for setting a personalized standard of care. Thus, one study has
found that tendency towards risky driving is correlated with risky financial
behaviors.124 Knowing how people invest might tell us also how they drive.
Of course, not every behavioral study published in a social science
journal should budge the standard of care. Many findings are preliminary
and perhaps questionable. The point we stress is the power of statistical
analysis over Big Data to pick up factors that, if confidently identified, can
tell us a lot about peoples’ dangerousness and their skill in accident
prevention.
Another type of information relevant to the determination of standards
of care is behavioral genetics information. It connects mental and cognitive
abilities and hormonal and neurological influences.125 Emerging
developments in brain imaging technology enable better understanding of
human behavior. One such development is fMRI (functional magnetic
resonance imaging) tests, examining the way the brain works during the
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Michal Kosinski, David Stillwell & Thore Graepel, Private Traits and Attributes Are
Predictable from Digital Records of Human Behavior, 110 PNAS 5802, 5804 (2013)
(explaining that digital records of Facebook likes can be used to predict human traits and
other characteristics).
121 Dan Murray & Kevan Durrell, Inferring Demographic Attributes of Anonymous Internet
Users, WEBKDD’99 WORKSHOP SAN DIEGO 7 (2000) (showing that demographic facts such
as sex, age, income, marital status, level of education can be inferred through usage
information analysis).
122 Michal Kosinski et al., Personality and Website Choice, WEBSCI 22, 24 (2012) (pointing
out the relationship between personality and website preferences).
123 As we have argued in Section IV.B.2, it might be reasonable to demand from lessorganized actors to take more precautions in order to decrease the risks they create.
124 Edward R. Morrison & Arpit Gupta, Health Shocks and Household Financial Fragility:
Evidence from Automobile Crashes and Consumer Bankruptcy Filings 24-25 (Feb. 13,
2013).
(unpublished
draft),
available
at
http://economics.uchicago.edu/workshops/Morrison%20Edward%20Health%20Shocks.pdf
(explaining that persistent financial distress may encourage risky behavior).
125 Robert Plomin & Avshalom Caspi, Behavioral Genetics and Personality, in HANDBOOK
OF PERSONALITY: THEORY AND RESEARCH 251 (Lawrence A. Pervin & Oliver P. John eds.,
1999) (presenting researches which show genetic contribution to personality).

PERSONALIZING NEGLIGENCE LAW

49

performance of particular tasks.126 The fMRI tests measure changes in
blood oxygenation levels in order to identify which regions of the brain
work during a specific task.127 Although fMRI images require substantial
interpretation, they are considered valuable in demonstrating cognitive
processes, and have in fact been proposed as a tool in tort cases and some
uses of this technique in criminal cases as already began.128 fMRI tests, and
neuroscience more generally, could inform the court as to how to define the
standard of care in a more concrete and nuanced manner than currently
done.129
Specifically, some research has shown correlation between
impulsivity, emotional reactions and violent behaviors on the one side, and
specific activity in several areas in the brain on the other side.130 It found a
significant neurological basis of aggressive and violent behaviors.131 Once a
defendant undergoes fMRI tests, the findings can be used by courts for
personalizing the standard of care. Thus, if those tests point out to the
defendant's impulsiveness and aggressiveness, courts might make the
proper adjustment in the standard of care.
3. Past Behaviors
We distinguish between similar past behaviors and different past
behaviors. Similar past behaviors can often be a good proxy for the
defendant's abilities and tendencies regarding risk-creation and precautiontaking. Thus, a traffic violations record of a driver could be used for
personalizing her standard of care.132 Information about a doctor's past
malpractice behavior might also be used by the court in personalizing the
standard of care.133 On many occasions, this kind of information is
126

Jean Macchiaroli Eggen & Eric. Laury, Toward a Neuroscience Model of Tort Law: How
Functional Neuroimaging Will Transform Tort Doctrine, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV.
235, 241 (2011-2012) (explaining the fMRI technique).
127 Owen D. Jones et al., Brain Imaging for Legal Thinkers: A Guide for the Perplexed, 2009
STANFORD TECH. L. REV. 5 (describing the various kinds of brain imaging).
128 See Eggen & Laury, supra note 126, at 249-52 (describing the various cases, mainly
criminal, in which fMRI has been used in courts).
129 See Prticia Smith Churchland, Moral Decision-Making and the Brain, in NEUROETICS:
DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY, PRACTICE AND POLICY 3, 10-11 (Judy Illes ed., 2006)
(arguing that fMRI can be used in order to identify the neurobiological differences between
a voluntary and an involuntary action).
130 Adrian Raine & Yaling Yang, Neural Foundations to Moral Reasoning and Antisocial
Behavior, SOCIAL, COGNITIVE, AND AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 203, 205 (2006) (showing
findings from brain imaging research on antisocial behavior and moral reasoning).
131 Jana L. Bufkin & Vickie R. Luttrell, Neuroimaging Studies of Aggressive and Violent
Behavior, 6 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 176, 187 (2005) (presenting researches’ findings
regarding brain areas that may be dysfunctional in offenders who are aggressive and
violent).
132 Eggen & Laury, supra note 126, at 360 (showing that data mining can be used to track
past traffic violations).
133 See the NPDB Public Use Data File that contains selected variables from medical
sources concerning physicians, dentists, and other licensed health care practitioners. THE
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available through official records.134
More problematic is the usage of information about different past
behaviors of the defendant and learning from that about her capabilities as
a potential wrongdoer. As we have explained, in the era of Big Data it is no
longer difficult to collect information about the defendant's past behavior,
as a consumer, driver, employee, patient, student, and in many other
capacities. As we have demonstrated, this past behavior might be
associated with specific capabilities and traits which are relevant to the
process of personalizing the standard of care.
Using past behavior as predictor of risk and as a factor in determining
the optimal precaution is a hallmark of insurance actuarialism—a practice
known as experience rating. Every driver is familiar with the increase in
insurance premium after an accident. This technique—personalizing the
premium charged to each policyholder based on past behavior—is founded
on the same tailored-treatment logic as personalized standards of care. In
the insurance context, the use of Big Data and high-intensity information
models is the bread and butter. Auto insurers, for example, invite
policyholders to install data recording devices in their cars, which transmit
information to insurers about driving habits, risk taking, and the
competence of the driver—information that is then factored into the
personalized pricing of the auto insurance policy.135 While courts cannot
base judgments on similarly installed recorders of conduct, they can tap
into any available resource of personal information to observe past
behavior and adjust the standard accordingly.
4. Resources
Another source of information, often readily available, is about
people’s resources. It is sometimes argued that the wealth of the injurer
should be factored into the design of negligence standards, perhaps because
high-resource injurers can more easily afford greater expenditures on
care.136 Inasmuch as such wealth-based standards are aimed at improving
wealth distribution in society, income taxes and fiscal policies are thought
to be superior tools, in the sense that they achieve redistribution more
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(16.5.15)
available
at
www.npdb.hrsa.gov/resources/publicData.jsp
134 Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 1437 (explaining how firms use publicly available
data bases). See also Eggen & Laury, supra note 126, at 358 (discussing the huge amount of
data that law enforcement agencies acquire through Big Data records).
135 See Brad Tuttle, Big Data Is My Copilot: Auto Insurers Push Devices That Track Driving
Habits, TIME (Aug. 6, 2013) business.time.com/2013/08/06/big-data-is-my-copilot-autoinsurers-push-devices-that-track-driving-habits/ (examining new Big Data devices that help
insurers profiling the drivers' driving habits).
136 Arlen, supra note 55 (arguing that care expenditures burden the rich less and thus can be
raised more than on the poor).
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efficiently and comprehensively.137 It might be thought, for example, that a
small rural hospital should not be held to the same standards of medical
care as a large city hospital, because the smaller facility cannot afford and
should not be asked to make the same level of expenditure in advanced
medical equipment. The small hospital may well face lower standard of
medical care, but not because of “affordability” or wealth. Rather, because
it treats smaller populations the value of investment in some devices is
lower, not sufficient to justify the costs.
CONCLUSION
This Article examined the justifications for a new type of negligence
law—abandoning the objective reasonable person standard and adopting
instead a personalized subjective standard of care. It identified several
important efficiency advantages to the selective adoption of personalized
standards, and argued that tort law’s other possible objectives, including
corrective and distributive justice, would also be served.
Our analysis reveals that personalization could be made in two
dimensions: the skill dimension and the risk dimension. Indeed, the
efficiency considerations (level of care, activity level, victim care and ex
ante investment) as well as the justice considerations (corrective and
distributive justice) often vary depending on whether personalization is
made according to the skill or according to the risk dimension, and also
whether it is done to increase or decrease the standard of care relative to the
uniform standard. Table 5 summarizes all the considerations, according to
the skill-risk, and increase-decrease (up-down) dimensions:

137

Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income
Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667-81 (1994) (arguing that tax
policies are more efficient than legal regulation in achieving distributive goals).
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TABLE 5: Effects of Personalization

A. Efficiency
1. Level of Care
2. Activity Level
3. Victim's Care
4.
Ex
Ante
Investments
B. Distributive
Justice
1. Among Injurers
2. Injurers vs.
Victims
Corrective
Justice

Skilled: up

Unskilled:
down

Risky: up

Safe:
down

+
+
-

+*
-

+
+
+
+

+*
+
+

+**
+

+**
-

-**
+

-**
-

+***

-

+

+

* Under the assumption of self-personalization, personalization has no effect
compared to a uniform standard.
** This conclusion might change if skills/safeness are deliberately acquired.
*** Corrective justice might require the skilled to do more than average, but would
not allow the unskilled to do less than average.

As the table indicates, the most favorable case for personalization is
increasing the standard of care for risky injurers. It might raise some
distributive justice concerns, especially if riskiness is exogenously
determined. Also, increasing the standard of care for skilled injurers has
many more pros than cons, although it does raise concerns about victim's
care, and might also create inefficient incentives to invest in improving
one's skills. As we have explained, however, in the process of
personalization, victim's care should be considered, and this might limit the
extent of personalization.138 And the ex ante investment problem could be
attenuated if personalization takes into account the optimal investment for
the injurer in improving his skills.139
Personalization requires enormous amounts of information and much
expertise in applying it, and we argued that advances in information
technology could put the legal system on the path to such information-rich
procedures. Even if the legal system lags behind other institutions in Big
Data advances, we argued that in the short run using a gradual mode of
personalization—by applying several discrete steps within the standard of
care—is relatively easy to implement.
Like any other use of Big Data, privacy concerns might slow down the
personalization of the standard of care. We believe they should not. One
138
139

Supra text following note 85.
Supra text following note 89.
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such concern is that the usage of Big Data in courts would encourage
further collection of sensitive information, which may be used to infringe
people’s privacy. But data about human characteristics has yielded
enormous returns and will continue to be collected and used for
commercial purposes, so there is no reason to assume that the further use of
it by courts for a public purpose would have any significant effect on its
already-occurring collection.140 Another concern is that Big Data and fMRI
tests would infringe on the privacy of the particular injurers sued in court
since it exposes personal characteristics. There are ways to protect people
from embarrassing revelations and restrict their use to trials without
abandoning the entire project. And it would be in the interest of many
injurers to voluntarily subject themselves to such screening, if they expect
the findings to reduce the personalized standards of care. Such voluntary
submission to screening would thus occur along the familiar unraveling
dynamic,141 because those injurers who would refuse to cooperate with the
courts in the process of tailoring the standard of care for them, would be
suspected by courts of being injurers for whom a high standard of care is
appropriate.
This paper studies personalization of negligence law, but there is no
reason to stop there. One of us previously suggested personalization of
other areas of law—disclosures and default rules.142 We can also think of
personalized regulatory standards, personalized penalties, and a host of
applications to the idea of personalized standards, beyond the realm of tort
law. Personalization is the trajectory of many other social and private
institutions, like insurance, medicine, education, employment, product
design, and advertising. In all these areas, personalization has yielded
substantial progress, even if some of its risks have to be monitored and
regulated. In the same way that personalized medicine can save lives and
avoid inefficient uniform treatments, personalized safety standards can
reduce the social costs of accidents. How long will negligence law resist
this enormous value of information?

140

Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 1467-69.
141 See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 2 (1998)
(defining the game theory concept of "unraveling" as "situations in which the ability of
people to draw inferences from silence leads to the revelation of information.").
142 Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 9.
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